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CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT SECTION




Seen at the outset as one of four complementary avenues for enforce-
ment of product safety obligations under the Consumer Product Safety Act
(CPSA),' section 15 has increasingly become the first among equals and
the favored enforcement tool of the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(Commission).2 Section 15 permits the Commission to order the recall,
* Member, District of Columbia Bar; B.A., 1971, University of Pennsylvania; M.A.,
1972, London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., 1976, Georgetown University
Law Center.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976). The Commission's formidable enforcement powers
permit it to levy fines of up to $500,000 per violation, to order businesses to conduct highly
expensive recall campaigns, to promulgate regulations affecting thousands of businesses, to
promulgate and enforce safety standards, and to ban specific consumer products.
2. Consumer Product Safety Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1976). See Address of Com-
missioner Stuart M. Statler, Western Safety Conference, Anaheim, Cal. (May 8, 1980).
Since 1973, businesses have recalled approximately 117 million products under the aus-
pices of the CPSA. The 1979 figure alone is 53.4 million products. 4 CONS. PROD. L. REP.
(P-H) No. 19, § 2, at 16 (Sept. 18, 1980).
The predominance of § 15 enforcement activity is also indicated by the dollar amounts of
the civil penalties exacted from covered firms. For example, in fiscal year 1979, the Com-
mission recovered $17 1,000 in civil penalties, $ 100,000 of which was assessed against Pittway
Corporation, d.b.a. BRK Electronics, for failure to report smoke detectors which the Com-
mission determined could create a substantial product hazard. The other cases involved
refuse bins ($21,000) and flammable carpets ($50,000). 1980 CPSC Ann. Rep. (Fiscal Year
1979) pt. 1, at 23.
The recent report of the Recall Effectiveness Task Force confirms the Commission staff's
intention to maintain the prominence of § 15 in the Commission's hierarchy of enforcement
measures. The task force recommended therein to the Commission:
The Commission has now processed more than twenty-five hundred corrective ac-
tions involving tens of millions of potentially hazardous product units which either
the Commission's staff or product manufacturers believed required correction, For
several reasons related to the nature of these cases and the direct and indirect costs
of litigation, only a handful of these cases have been the subject of formal enforce-
ment actions by the Commission following a breakdown in voluntary negotiations.
Only once among these actions has a question of recall effectiveness been directly
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repair, replacement, and refund of consumer products which represent a
"substantial product hazard," and imposes reporting requirements upon
firms distributing products which "could" create a substantial product haz-
ard. Over the last two years it has eclipsed the significance of section 7,
providing for the promulgation of product safety standards, section 8, pro-
viding for the banning of hazardous products, and section 12, providing
for seizure of imminently hazardous products.3
There are many reasons for section 15's emergence as the Commission's
principal enforcement mechanism. Most important from the Commis-
sion's standpoint is the speed and cost efficiency of section 15 actions as
compared to the processes required to promulgate a standard, implement a
ban, or proceed against an imminently hazardous product. The Commis-
sion's experience has been that the latter enforcement routes may take
months or years,4 while section 15 actions have moved with sometimes
astonishing swiftness in removing allegedly hazardous products from the
hands of consumers.5
The speed and efficiency of section 15 is of heightened importance to the
Commission because despite its far reaching regulatory and enforcement
in issue. The Task Force identifies several long-term costs associated with the his-
toric infrequency of such litigation. On balance, we conclude that if the Commis-
sion wants to utilize its recall authority routinely as a formal regulatory response to
product hazards, to push that authority to its limits of creativity and effectiveness,
and to make clear that it will seek formal remedies if negotiations break down, it
would appear that some amount of litigation designed to achieve these purposes is
necessary. The Task Force recommends that both the Commissioners and the Ex-
ecutive Director seek to identify and advance litigation well suited to these pur-
poses in a limited number of appropriate cases.
Report of the Recall Effectiveness Task Force, CPSC, Executive Summary, at 3 (Aug. 25,
1980).
As early as 1975, former Chairman Richard 0. Simpson stated to the Consumer Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Commerce Committee:
There is absolutely no question in any of our minds but that section 15 of the act
has proven to be a key feature of the law, more key, I think, than was envisioned
by the Congress when they drafted the law. . . [or] than envisioned by those of us
in the agency who tried to initially allocate our priorities.
Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act Before the Subcomm.
for Consumers ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1975) (Remarks
of Richard 0. Simpson).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056, 2057, 2061 (1976).
4. See Address of Margaret Freeston, Deputy General Counsel, CPSC, Product Safety
Conference, Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1980); Statler Address, supra note 2.
5. E , 11 NAT'L J. 357, 358 (March 1, 1980). In the recall of hand-held hair dryers
containing asbestos insulating elements, "[o]nce the Commission had the hard data, it
moved quickly. A few days after [the local television news account] broke, the agency met




powers, it is one of the smallest regulatory agencies.6 In light of the pres-
sures exerted by Congress and the public on federal agencies to prove their
mettle or be dramatically reduced in stature,7 the Commission is predict-
ably interested in providing prompt, complete, and inexpensive resolution
of perceived consumer product safety problems.
Through its increased use of section 15 compliance investigations and
civil penalty actions against firms for failing to promptly report substantial
product hazards, and the recent reorganization of the Compliance and En-
forcement Directorate to accomplish that end,8 the Commission has put
businesses on notice that careful quality control and immediate reporting
of potential safety problems are expected. In addition, both Commission
members and staff have stated that they expect to use section 15 in the
future to regulate specific products and product safety problems heretofore
regulated, often ineffectively, by standards, bans, or injunctive actions.9
Despite the attraction of vigorous use of section 15, and the concomitant
6. The Commission has a budget of approximately $40,000,000 and a staff of fewer
than 900, making it one of the smallest regulatory agencies. Id at 357. It has a budget
allocation of 13% of that of the Food and Drug Administration, and less than 1% of that of
the Environmental Protection Agency. Compared to the CPSC staff of 900, the FDA has
7,600 staff, the EPA has 10,600. Over the past four years, taking inflation into account, the
Commission's real budget has declined 22%. Statler Address, supra note 2.
7. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (April 6, 1979) (Re-
marks of Rep. James H. Scheuer); Nguyen, Regulatory Reform (Heritage Foundation 1980),
reported in 231 DAILY EXEC. REP. (BNA) A-9 (Nov. 28, 1980). See also Budget Cuts Will
Force CPSC to Look to Section 15, 10 Prod. Saf. Letter I (Feb. 16, 1981).
8. See Memorandum of Susan B. King, Chairman of the CPSC (Sept. 18, 1980) (Reor-
ganization of the Commission's Litigation Function). See also 9 Prod. Saf. Letter 1-2 (Sept.
22, 1980) & note 159 infra.
9. For example, in his statement to the Western Safety Conference, supra note 2, Com-
missioner Statler, following reference to the comprehensive hair dryer remedial actions
under § 15, predicted:
In the future, we may choose to adopt this Section 15 approach in numerous
other cases. For example, the Commission might find that a product lacking a
specific safety device-perhaps a chain saw without a chain brake, a permanent
noseguard, or low kickback chain-presents a defacto substantial product hazard
subject to recall or other corrective action.
Economics provides one of the most compelling reasons to expand the use of our
Section 15 authority. It has proved to be one of the Commission's most cost effec-
tive and timely means for ensuring consumer protection. While developing a
mandatory standard can take years and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, im-
plementing a substantial product hazard action can, if need be, occur within weeks.
More importantly, while standards generally focus on prospective hazards, Section
15 actions are explicitly designed to remove hazards already in consumers' hands.
By avoiding the time-consuming legal and procedural delays inherent in standards
development, the Commission can provide more timely and more direct consumer
protection (emphasis in original).
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diminution of the importance of sections 7, 8, and 12,10 there are, never-
theless, practical, legal, and public policy problems with the Commission's
choice. These problems, discussed more fully herein, include the fact that
section 15 recall efforts, directed towards the specific products of individu-
al firms, have not been uniformly effective." Nor is there any indication
that they have been or are likely to be, even under optimal circumstances,
as effective in removing unsafe products from distribution as are product
safety standards or product bans. In addition, increased reliance on sec-
tion 15 to remedy product safety problems will force the Commission to
rely increasingly-and unnecessarily--on that section's vague language,
such as "substantial product hazard"-a term which neither the statute nor
the legislative history defines with any specificity.' 2 In addition, the result-
ing case by case resolution of product safety questions is inevitably less
instructive to covered firms, the public, and for that matter the Commis-
sion, than are explicit product safety standards or general prohibitions as
to what represents an acceptable level of safety for a particular product or
classes of products.
Moreover, section 15 contemplates a substantial product hazard and re-
quires a level and magnitude of product hazard problem which differs
from that required to promulgate a product safety standard under section
7, to ban a product under section 8, or to declare a product imminently
hazardous under section 12. 13 For these reasons, the fact that the Commis-
sion may now attempt to alleviate its real or perceived financial or political
problems through the simple expedient of making section 15 its enforce-
ment centerpiece, to the derogation of other enforcement procedures in the
Act, has aroused concern.
In light of the increased use of section 15, familiarity with its substantive
and procedural provisions takes on a new importance to manufacturers,
In an interview, CPSC Executive Director Richard Gross stated that he foresaw § 15 ac-
tion on benzidine dyes, products containing asbestos, and products, such as wrapping paper,
containing lead. 9 Prod. Saf. Letter 1 (March 10, 1980).
10. Freeston Address, supra note 4.
II. Commissioner Zagoria, in recognition of this, has proposed that the Commission
review recalls which after six months fail to recover 10% of the affected product units. 9
Prod. Saf. Letter No. 2 (March 10, 1980). In this regard, the report of the Recall Effective-
ness Task Force, supra note 2, at 3, noted:
The Task Force was created to address a continuing major concern of the Com-
mission regarding the sometimes low rate of return, by consumers, of recalled haz-
ardous products. The seriousness of this concern was reflected in the
Commissioners' vote of November, 1979, to place the issue of recall effectiveness
on its published list of regulatory process priorities.
12. See, e.g., note 31 infra. See alsonotes 21-61 infra.
13. See notes 64-66 infra.
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distributors, retailers, importers, and private labelers. With reference,
where appropriate, to the concerns expressed above, what follows will be
an explanation of section 15, the regulations issued thereunder, and the
formal and informal proceedings brought under the section.
II. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 15
The Consumer Product Safety Act, in section 15, compels firms to report
to the Commission whenever a product is or even might be unduly danger-
ous, and gives the Commission broad powers to command product recalls
under certain circumstances. Both recall and reporting requirements are
keyed to the phrase "substantial product hazard." A recall can be required
when a product is found "actually" to constitute a substantial product haz-
ard, but a report to the Commission is also required when a product
"could" be a substantial product hazard.
Specifically, section 15 requires a subject firm to notify the Commission
that its product: (1) does not comply with an applicable consumer product
safety rule, or (2) contains a "defect" which could create a "substantial risk
of injury to the public" and therefore presents a substantial product haz-
ard.'" When either the failure to comply with the rule or the actual defect
creates a substantial risk of injury to the public and therefore constitutes a
substantial product hazard, section 15 further authorizes the Commission,
after a hearing, to order a firm to provide notice of any such hazard to the
public, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, and purchasers (including
consumers), and further to order replacement, repair, or refund of the
purchase price, less a reasonable allowance for use.'
5
14. Section 15(a) defines "substantial product hazard" as
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule which
creates a substantial risk of injury to the public, or
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the number of
defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise)
creates a substantial risk of injury to the public.
15 U.S.C. § 2064(a) (1975). Section 15(b) describes action to be taken upon discovery of
potentially unsafe products:
Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and every
distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains information which reasonably
supports the conclusion that such product-
(1) fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule; or
(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard described
in subsection (a)(2), shall immediately inform the Commission of such failure to
comply or of such defect, unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has ac-
tual knowledge that the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect
or failure to comply.
Id § 2064(b).
15. While the imposition of a reporting requirement caused much comment at the time
1981]
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In addition to providing for voluntary remedial action, including "cor-
rective action plans" and consent agreements, section 15 gives the Com-
mission authority to seek injunctive relief to prevent further distribution of
an allegedly dangerous product. Since the vast majority of section 15 in-
vestigations are concluded by the Commission's approval of a firm's vol-
untary remedial action, only a handful of section 15 matters have been
litigated. However, the Commission has brought several "timeliness
cases" against firms which assertedly failed promptly to report potential
substantial product hazards. 16
As noted above, the Commission cannot order public notice of a hazard
under section 15(c) or a recall under section 15(d) unless a product actually
constitutes a "substantial product hazard" within the meaning of section
15(a). In any event, as a practical matter, most recalls are conducted vol-
untarily, in most cases following a firm's voluntary report to the Commis-
sion under section 15(b).
In general terms, section 15(b)' 7 requires every manufacturer, importer,
distributor, or retailer of a consumer product to notify the Commission
upon learning that the product does not comply with a consumer product
the CPSA was enacted, such a requirement was not, as many thought, a novel provision.
Earlier reporting requirements can be found in the Radiation Control for Health and Safety
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 263(b)-(n) (1976), which requires manufacturers (but not distributors or
retailers) of electronic products which fail to comply with a standard issued under that act or
which have a "defect which relates to the safety of use of such product by reason of the
emission of electronic product radiation," to notify the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare. Id at § 263(g). Section 151 of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381-1431 (1976), obliges manufacturers who learn that a motor vehicle
or "item of replacement equipment" either contains a "defect" which "relates to motor vehi-
cle safety" or does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard to notify the
Secretary of Transportation, owners, purchasers, and dealers of the problem and remedy it
in accordance with § 154 of that act. Id at § 1411. Similarly, following passage of the
CPSA, Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976),
which in § 8(e) requires any manufacturer, processor, or distributor of a chemical substance
who learns that the substance "presents a substantial risk of harm to health or the environ-
ment" to report this information to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency.
16. See notes 130-48 and accompanying text infra.
17. Section 15(b) provides:
Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and every
distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains information which reasonably
supports the conclusion that such product-
(1) fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule; or
(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard described
in subsection (a)(2) of this section,
shall immediately inform the Commission of such failure to comply or of such
defect, unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has actual knowledge that
the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect or failure to comply.
15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1976).
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safety rule or contains a defect which could create a substantial product
hazard.
Failure to furnish information required by section 15(b) is prohibited
under section 19(a)(4) of the Act, and a knowing violation of section
19(a)(4) may subject the violator to civil penalties. 8 A violation can be
18. Section 19 ("Prohibited Acts"), 15 U.S.C. § 2068 (1976), provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to-
(1) manufacture for sale, offer for sale, distribute in commerce, or import into
the United States any consumer product which is not in conformity with an appli-
cable consumer product safety standard under this Act;
(2) manufacture for sale, offer for sale, distribute in commerce, or import into the
United States any consumer product which has been declared a banned hazardous
product by a rule under this Act;
(3) fail or refuse to permit access to or copying of records, or fail or refuse to
establish or maintain records, or fail or refuse to make reports or provide informa-
tion, or fail or refuse to permit entry or inspection, as required under this Act or
rule thereunder;
(4) fail to furnish information required by section 15(b);
(5) fail to comply with an order issued under section 15(c) or (d) (relating to
notification, and to repair, replacement, and refund, and to prohibited acts);
Section 20 ("Civil Penalties"), 15 U.S.C. § 2069 (1976), provides:
(a)(I) Any person who knowingly violates section 19 of this Act shall be subject
to a civil penalty not to exceed $2,000 for each such violation. Subject to para-
graph (2), a violation of section 19(a) (i), (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), or (10) shall
constitute a separate offense with respect to each consumer product involved, ex-
cept that the maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500,000 for any related se-
ries of violations. A violation of section 19(a)(3) shall constitute a separate
violation with respect to each failure or refusal to allow or perform an act required
thereby; and, if such violation is a continuing one, each day of such violations shall
constitute a separate offense, except that the maximum civil penalty shall not ex-
ceed $500,000 for any related series of violations.
(2)The second sentence of paragraph (I) of this subsection shall not apply to
violations of paragraph (1) or (2) of section 19(a)--
(A) if the person who violated such paragraphs is not the manufacturer or pri-
vate labeler or a distributor of the products involved, and
(B) if such person did not have either (i) actual knowledge that his distribution
or sale of the product violated such paragraphs or (ii) notice from the Commission
that such distribution or sale would be a violation of such paragraphs.
(b) Any civil penalty under this section may be compromised by the Commis-
sion. In determining the amount of such penalty or whether it should be remitted
or mitigated and in what amount, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of
the business of the person charged and the gravity of the violation shall be consid-
ered. The amount of such penalty when finally determined, or the amount agreed
on compromise, may be deducted from any sums owing by the United States to the
person charged.
(c) As used in the first sentence of subsection (a)(l) of this section, the term
"knowingly" means (1) the having of actual knowledge, or (2) the presumed hav-
ing of knowledge deemed to be possessed by a reasonable man who acts in the
circumstances, including knowledge obtainable upon the exercise of due care to
ascertain the truth of representations.
1981]
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found with respect to each consumer product involved, with a maximum
penalty of $500,000 for a related series of violations. A knowing violation
of section 19 following a Commission Notice of Noncompliance can sub-
ject the violator to criminal penalties under section 21 of the Act. 19
III. DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIAL PRODUCT HAZARD"
A. Failure to Comply With An Applicable Consumer Product Safety Rule
The first prong of the definition of "substantial product hazard" sets up
an automatic reporting requirement: if the product fails to comply with an
applicable consumer product safety rule, it must be reported whether or
not the noncompliance is likely to cause injury. A consumer product safety
rule is defined in section 3(a)(2) of the Act to include "a consumer product
safety standard described in section 7(a), or a rule under this Act declaring
a consumer product a banned hazardous product."2 Thus, standards such
as the architectural glass standard,2 and bans such as the refuse bins
ban,22 are both included under the rubric of consumer product safety rule.
All violations, no matter how minor, are required to be reported.
Note, however, that the definition of consumer product safety rule does
not include the failure of a product to comply with a standard or regula-
tion issued under the four other statutes administered by the Commission:
the Flammable Fabrics Act,23 the Federal Hazardous Substances Act,24
the Poison Prevention Packaging Act,25 and the Refrigerator Safety Act.26
Thus, a violation of the children's sleepwear standard or the bicycle stan-
dard does not automatically trigger reporting duties under section 15(b).
Reporting is necessary, however, under the second prong of section 15(b),
19. Section 21 ("Criminal Penalties"), 15 U.S.C. § 2070 (1976), provides:
(a) Any person who knowingly and willfully violates section 19 of this Act after
having received notice of noncompliance from the Commission shall be fined not
more than $50,000 or be imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(b) Any individual director, officer, or agent of a corporation who knowingly
and willfully authorizes, orders, or performs any of the acts or practices constitut-
ing in whole or in part a violation of section 19, and who has knowledge of notice
of noncompliance received by the corporation from the Commission, shall be sub-
ject to penalties under this section, without regard to any penalties to which that
corporation may be subject under subsection (a).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (1976).
21. 16 C.F.R. § 1201 (1980).
22. Id § 1301.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1976).
24. Id §§ 1261-1274.
25. Id §§ 1471-1476.
26. Id §§ 1211-1214.
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if the noncompliance under these statutes results in a defect which could
create a substantial product hazard.
Because of the limited number of product safety standards and product
bans, Commission enforcement of section 15 has focused primarily on the
provisions of section 15(b)(2).27 Determining whether a report is required
under this section is a complicated task, requiring careful analysis of both
the statute and the facts surrounding the potential defect. Moreover, such
decisions are usually made in a pressured atmosphere generated by the
need to act as rapidly as possible to prevent injury if the product is found
to be hazardous and to comply with the time limits implied by the statute
and made explicit by the Commission's regulations.28
Before examining these reporting requirements, one important factor
should be noted: section 15 and the section 15 regulations plainly require
reporting a defect whenever a product could be dangerous, not merely
when there is some reason to conclude that it actually is dangerous. The
reason is that injuries can be prevented if the manufacturer and the Com-
mission focus on the problem early.29
Turning to the statute itself, section 15(b)(2) requires a report when a
product "contains a defect which could create a substantial product haz-
ard" as described in section 15(a). Section 15(a), in turn, defines a substan-
tial product hazard as:
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product
safety rule which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public,
or
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the
number of defective products distributed in commerce, the sever-
ity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a substantial risk of injury to
the public.3"
Under section 15(a)(2) and section 15(b)(2), therefore, a series of ques-
27. Section 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1976), provides:
Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and every
distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains information which reasonably
supports the conclusion that such product-
(1) fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule; or
(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard described
in subsection (a)(2),
shall immediately inform the Commission of such failure to comply or of such
defect, unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has actual knowlege that
the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect or failure to comply.
28. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14 (1980).
29. The regulations and the Commission's accompanying comments stress that firms
should report promptly, even if there is some doubt as to whether a defect exists. See 16
C.F.R. § 1115.4(e) (1980).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b)(1), (2) (1976).
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tions must be resolved in determining whether a particular product could
create a substantial product hazard: is there a product "defect"? If so,
does this defect create a substantial risk of injury to the public because of
the pattern of the defect, the number of defective products distributed in
commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise? Each of these questions
will be treated in order, followed by a discussion of various other questions
raised by the statute and implementing regulations, such as who must
make a report, and what information must be reported.
Due to the absence of a statutory definition of "defect" and several other
operative phrases,3 ' and because of the scarcity of section 15 litigation, it is
necessary to examine the Commission's section 15 regulations, 32 staff
memoranda published both before and contemporaneous with the section
15 regulations, the legislative history, and the common law to flesh out
section 15--4.e., to find out what constitutes a "defect," and in what cir-
cumstances that defect will be considered to present a substantial product
hazard.
Because these rules are merely interpretive, failure to adhere to the strict
letter of the rules will not, without more, constitute a violation of the Act.3 3
31. The Commission staff has conceded the problems posed by the absence of a statu-
tory definition of "defect." In its Interim Report to the Recall Effectiveness Task Force, the
Recall Task Force observes:
The determination of a product's noncompliance [with a product safety rule] is a
relatively straightforward matter. Such a finding is guided by the detailed stan-
dards contained in any one of the nine product safety standards or bans which
have been promulgated under the CPSA. However, the questions of what consti-
tutes a defect or creates a substantial risk of injury are ones about which the Com-
mission and its staff have had much less detailed guidance.
Interim Report, Recall Effectiveness Task Force 6 (March 17, 1980). The term "defect" is
not defined by the CPSA. Its definition is, however, the subject of discussion in a regulation
published by the Commission in 1978 on the issue of when a firm's duty arises to report
information suggesting a possible defect under § 15(b) of the Act.
32. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,988 (1978). An earlier set of regulations had been published on
February 14, 1974, and codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1115 (1974) (effective March 21, 1974). The
Commission had also issued regulations entitled "Policy and Procedures Regarding Sub-
stantial Product Hazards" on July 24, 1975 (effective August 25, 1975). Both of these previ-
ous regulations were superseded by the 1978 regulations.
33. As the Commission stated, "a firm charged with violating Section 15 through acts
which are contrary to these rules will always have an opportunity to urge the reasonableness
of its actions under the circumstances, thereby defeating the accusation." 43 Fed. Reg.
34,990 (1978).
In issuing these rules as "interpretive," the Commission eliminated the statement in the
proposed rule that remedial and sanction actions would be brought for violations "of this
Part." 43 Fed. Reg. 34,990 (1978). Commentators on the proposed rule claimed this lan-
guage gave the rule substantive effect. In its comments on the 1978 rules the Commission
explained its view of the difference between substantive and procedural rules in this way:
A substantive rule has the force and effect of law. Thus, a violation of a substan-
tive rule issued under the CPSA is equivalent to a violation of the CPSA. In con-
[Vol. 30:195
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However, inasmuch as the rules represent a thorough and specific expres-
sion of section 15 enforcement policy, all firms are best advised to devote
close attention to the section 15 regulations.34
trast, an interpretive rule offers guidance as to what a law means, but does not itself
have the force and effect of law. A violation of an interpretive rule is not necessar-
ily a violation of law; the failure to comply with an interpretive rule is a violation
of the law under which it is issued only if the rule reasonably interprets that law.
In issuing these rules under Section 15 of the CPSA, Commission believes it has
reasonably interpreted the provisions and obligations of that section.
Id
Former Chairman S. John Byington earlier endorsed the value of the proposed rules as
guidelines for those subject to the reporting requirement of § 15(b). In a December 16, 1977
letter to Senator Wendell H. Ford, the Chairman observed:
The obligation of these groups exists by statute, whether there are regulations or
not. However, the proposal does set forth guidelines for persons subject to section
15(b) of the Act to assist them in meeting the requirement to report all defects that
could create a substantial product hazard.
The proposed regulations are intended to encourage and facilitate reporting by
setting out the factors which persons subject to the requirement should consider
and by indicating what factors the Commission believes are important (emphasis
in original).
The statutory authority for promulgating substantive rules under § 15(b) was assayed in
two staff memoranda before the amended rules were proposed. One memorandum found
such authority in CPSA § 27. Memorandum of Catherine C. Cook to the Commission, Pre-
liminary Evaluation of Comments on Proposed Section 15 Regulation, at 3 (Jan. 30, 1978).
Another staff member concluded that "section 15 contains no express authority to issue such
substantive rules, and we believe it is arguable whether Section 27 provides such authority."
The latter staff member nevertheless concluded that, because the proposed rules had been
the subject of public notice and comment, their characterization as substantive or interpreta-
tive was academic. Memorandum of Margaret A. Freeston to the Commission, Preliminary
Evaluation of Proposed Section 15 Regulations, at 6 (Feb. 21, 1978).
By way of comparison, § 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(g)
(1976), specifically states that the FTC may "make rules and regulations for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions FTC Act." In National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC,
the court determined that this language empowered the FTC to issue substantive rules as a
means of enforcing § 6(g) which contains a broad grant of rulemaking authority. 482 F.2d
672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Unlike the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, the CPSA contains no analogous broad grant of rulemaking authority, although
specific sections do mention rulemaking for specified purposes.
Some impetus for the § 15(b) rules change was provided by a 1978 report of the Govern-
ment Accounting Office. The GAO noted that the Commission had no program for
familiarizing firms with § 15 reporting responsibilities, and that the Commission and the
Commission staff differed in their definition of substantial product hazards. The GAO re-
port recommended, inter alia, that the Commission refine and particularize its criteria for
identifying substantial product hazards and further devise means of informing firms of their
responsibilities to report defects. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION HAS No ASSURANCE THAT PRODUCT DEFECTS ARE BEING
REPORTED AND CORRECTED 11, 18, 26 (1978).
34. While issuing these regulations as "interpretive," the Commission nevertheless ex-
pressed its intent that "subject firms [be put] fairly on notice of the Commission's view of the
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B. Meaning of "Defect"
1. Commission Interpretation of "Defect"
Absent an applicable consumer product safety rule, the first question to
be resolved in deciding whether a section 15 report is needed is whether
the product contains a "defect." The Commission's final35 section 15 rules
did not attempt to define "defect,"36 but opted instead for a brief interpre-
tation accompanied by illustrative examples. The section describes defect
as including, at a minimum, the commonly accepted dictionary meaning of
the word. In general terms, the rules continue, a defect is a "fault, flaw, or
irregularity that causes weakness, failure, or inadequacy in form or func-
tion."37
law," Le., that under the Act the Commission can issue substantive rules. 43 Fed. Reg.
34,990 (1978).
35. The 1975 regulations did not include any definition or explanation of the word "de-
fect," instead restating the statutory language of § 15. 16 C.F.R. § 11 16.3(a)(2) (1975).
In its proposed § 15 rules, the Commission provided the following definition of the term
"defect":
A "defect" within the meaning of section 15 of the CPSA is any aspect of a product
which creates an unnecessary risk of injury. Such aspects include, but are not lim-
ited to the following: Performance, composition, contents, design, construction,
finish, packaging, warnings, and instructions. A product presents an unnecessary
risk if the aspect which creates the risk is not necessary for the product to perform
its functional purpose. A risk is also unnecessary if the benefits (including recrea-
tional and aesthetic benefits) to be gained from use of the product do not justify the
risk of injury. A product defect within the meaning of § 15 includes both unin-
tended manufacturing errors and/or imperfections and intended product aspects.
42 Fed. Reg. 46,720 (1977).
In making this proposal, the Commission staff interpreted § 15(a)(2) to mean that a prod-
uct defect creates a substantial risk of injury to the public and represents, therefore, a sub-
stantial product hazard "if the nature and extent of public exposure to the hazard is
substantial." Memorandum of Catherine C. Cook and William F. Kitzes to the Commission,
at 3 (April 1, 1977), reprintedin PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
ACT, Course Handbook Series No. 103 (1977). The Commission staff stated that the revi-
sions "can provide further guidance by defining the term defect and by describing the way in
which substantiality of a hazard will be assessed." Id at 2.
36. In preparing the final regulations the Commission was persuaded by the concern of
many commentators that a comprehensive Commission definition of "defect" would be ap-
plied by courts in civil products liability disputes, possibly increasing the financial exposure
of subject firms. The Commission accordingly included the following language in the final
version of the regulation: "Defect, as discussed in this section and as used by the Commis-
sion and staff, pertains only to interpreting and enforcing the Consumer Product Safety Act.
The criteria and discussion in this section are not intended to apply to any other areas of
law." 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1980).
37. Id The section continues:
A defect, for example, may be the result of a manufacturing or production error;
that is, the consumer product as manufactured is not in the form intended by, or
fails to perform in accordance with, its design. In addition, the design of and the
materials used in a consumer product may also result in a defect. Thus, a product
[Vol. 30:195
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The rules set out several representative illustrations of product defects:
(1) manufacturing or production defect: an electric-appliance casing
which can, through manufacturing error, be electrically charged by full-
line voltage; (2) labeling and marketing defect:38 athletic shoes advertised
for, but unsuited to, running and which cause muscle or tendon injury; (3)
defect due to inadequate warnings and instructions: a power tool without
adequate instructions or safety warnings, even in the absence of reported
injuries, where foreseeable use or misuse could result in injury based in
part on the inadequate warnings or instructions; and (4) defect due to con-
sumer reliance and product nonperformance: a garage exhaust fan adver-
tised to activate when fumes reach a dangerous level, but which fails, for
whatever reason, to do SO. 3
9
In addition to describing manufacturing, design, labeling (including
warning labels), and marketing defects, the Commission's discussion of de-
fect implies a balancing test of utility and risk, using the example of a
metalicized kite and an ordinary kitchen knife to illustrate the risk/utility
evaluation. According to the Commission, while the finish of a
metalicized kite may be attractive and the kite may fly better for its added
weight, because the kite can conduct electricity from air to ground and can
foreseeably become tangled with power lines, it is defective within the
meaning of section 15(a), even if designed, manufactured, and marketed as
intended, and thus is not defective in the sense of a manufacturing de-
fect.40
On the other hand, a kitchen knife, designed, manufactured, and mar-
keted as intended, can also cause serious injury. However, because the
knife's sharp edge is necessary for the proper functioning of the knife, and
the risk of injury is outweighed by the usefulness of the knife, under the
Commission's interpretation this "necessary" risk is not a defect within the
may contain a defect even if the product is manufactured exactly in accordance
with its design and specifications, if the design presents a risk of injury to the pub-
lic. A design defect may also be present if the risk of injury occurs as a result of the
operation or use of the product or the failure of the product to operate as intended.
A defect can also occur in a product's contents, construction, finish, packaging,
warnings, and/or instructions. With respect to instructions, a consumer product
may contain a defect if the instructions for assembly or use could allow the prod-
uct, otherwise safely designed and manufactured, to present a risk of injury.
38. The term "marketing" is the Commission's. While the CPSA does not vest the
Commission with authority to impose "marketing" requirements as such, it does, in
§ 7(a)(ii)(B), authorize Commission promulgation of standards which may include
"[r]equirements that a consumer product be marked with or accompanied by clear and ade-
quate warnings or instructions, or requirements respecting the form of warnings or instruc-
tions." 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a)(i)(B) (1976).
39. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1980).
40. Id
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meaning of section 15(a). 4
2. Common and Uniform Code Law
The relationship between the Commission's interpretation of "defect"
for section 15 purposes and the interpretation by courts of "defects" for
product liability purposes raises the question of how the Commission will
treat preexisting judicial interpretation of what represents a product defect.
The Commission stated in the preamble to its final rules that it intends the
term "defect" "to include the broadest meaning found in Federal and State
statutes and in judicial pronouncements."42 The Commission also makes it
clear that it will rely freely on product liability precedent in assessing the
absence or presence of a product defect under the statute.43
Reference to common law definitions of defect therefore offers useful
comparisons for the purpose of anticipating how the Commission will in-
41. Id In its explanatory comments the Commission stated that even though balancing
of risk and benefit inheres in the concept of defect, subject firms were nevertheless cautioned
"not to engage in lengthy analysis before reporting," and that "given the Commission's
broad and inclusive interpretation of defect, they should report if in doubt as to whether a
defect exists which could create a substantial product hazard." 43 Fed. Reg. 34,991 (1978).
On the basis of the public comments, the Commission eliminated its earlier proposed
risk/benefit guideline providing that "[a] risk is also unnecessary if the benefits (including
recreational and aesthetic benefits) to be gained from use of the product do not justify the
risk of injury." 42 Fed. Reg. 46,720, 46,723 (1977).
Concerning the risk-benefit analysis in the Commission's proposed 16 C.F.R.
§ 11 15.3(b)(3), the Cook-Kitzes Memorandum offered this example:
Thus a gasoline-powered lawnmower would contain a defect if its throttle tended
to stick in the open position causing it to run away. The benefit to be derived-
cutting grass with minimal human effort would not justify the risk of injury to the
operator or passerby. This is especially so since the benefit could be retained and
the risk reduced or eliminated by redesigning the throttle or correcting the throttle
assembly.
Cook-Kitzes Memorandum, supra note 35, at 3.
42. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,991 (1978).
43. For example, although the final rule dropped the proposed reference to "any as-
pect" of a product, the Commission discussion of the final rule makes it clear that a defect in
any aspect of a consumer product, including design characteristics, instructions, and warn-
ings, can, taken separately, render the product "defective" within the meaning of § 15(a)(2).
Acknowledging that design characteristics and inadequate instructions and warnings have
been found to be product defects in product liability suits, the Commission's prefatory com-
ments state:
[T]hose aspects of products which are accepted by the courts as presenting unrea-
sonable risks, as well as those discussed specifically in § I 115.4, would be defective
within meaning of section 15 of the CPSA. Of course neither the regulation nor
judicial determinations constitute the definitive statement as to which aspects of




terpret defect as used in section 15. What constitutes a defect has been the
subject of repeated analysis by courts in product liability cases, especially
those brought within the strict liability ambit of section 402A of the Re-
statement of Torts,4 and will not be treated here in any detail. Generally,
where liability is alleged on the theory of negligence, a manufacturer "is
under a duty to use reasonable care to design a product that is reasonably
safe for its intended use, and for other uses which are foreseeably proba-
ble.",4' Thus, the unifying premise of most decisions in negligence actions
construing the term defect is to consider defective "those products ...
which are dangerous because they fail to perform in the manner reason-
ably to be expected in light of their nature and intended function. 46
Under concepts of strict liability, on the other hand, liability may attach
even where a product performs precisely as intended, and "[t]he product is
to be regarded as defective if it is not safe for such a use that can be ex-
pected to be made of it, and no warning is given."
47
The Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 48 a fairly recent attempt to
order the diverse body of state product liability law, would assess liability
where a "claimant's harm was proximately caused because the product
was defective.",49 A product is considered defective if: "(1) It was unrea-
sonably unsafe in construction ...; (2) It was unreasonably unsafe in
design. . .; (3) It was unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or
instructions were not provided ...; or (4) It was unreasonably unsafe
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), which provides as follows:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
45. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 645 (4th ed. 1971). See also MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 145 N.Y.S. 462 (1916); Pitts v. Basile, 55 Ill. App.
2d 37, 204 N.E.2d 43 (1965); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 154, 542 P.2d
774 (1975).
46. Durham v. Baughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 342, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403
(1969).
47. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791,826 (1966); Traynor, The
Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 367
(1965).
48. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
49. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,721 (1979).
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because it did not conform to the product seller's express war-
ranty . ,5o The Commission has not, to date, specifically decided how
a party may use a showing that the manufacture of a product conformed to
the state of the art.5 ' From at least the strict liability and Model Uniform
Product Liability Act approaches, it follows that under section 15 the man-
ufacture or distribution of a consumer product consistent "with the state of
the art is a fact without independent legal significance; it is not an affirma-
50. Id Each of the four clauses in § 104 refers to explanatory comments in the suc-
ceeding paragraphs, which state:
(A) The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe in Construction. In order to deter-
mine that the product was unreasonably unsafe in construction, the trier of fact
must find that, when the product left the control of the manufacturer, the product
deviated in some material way from the manufacturer's design specifications or
performance standards, or from otherwise identical units of the same product line.
(B) The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe in Design.
(1) In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe in design,
the trier of fact must find that, at the time of manufacture, the likelihood that the
product would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of
those harms outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a product that
would have prevented those harms, and the adverse effect that alternative design
would have on the usefulness of the product.
(C) The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe Because Adequate Warnings or In-
structions Were Not Provided.
(1) In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe because
adequate warnings or instructions were not provided about a danger connected
with the product or its proper use, the trier of fact must find that, at the time of
manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's harm or
similar harms and the seriousness of those harms rendered the manufacturer's in-
structions inadequate and that the manufacturer should and could have provided
the instructions or warnings which claimant alleges would have been adequate.
(6) Post-Manufacture Duty to Warn. In addition to the claim provided in Sub-
section (C)(1), a claim may arise under this Subsection where a reasonably prudent
manufacturer should have learned about a danger connected with the product after
it was manufactured. In such a case, the manufacturer is under an obligation to act
with regard to the danger as a reasonably prudent manufacturer in the same or
similar circumstances. This obligation is satisfied if the manufacturer makes rea-
sonable efforts to inform product users or a person who may be reasonably ex-
pected to assure that action is taken to avoid the harm, or that the risk of harm is
explained to the actual product user.
(D) The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe Because It Did Not Conform to an
Express Warranty. In order to determine that the product was unreasonably un-
safe because it did not conform to an express warranty, the trier of fact must find
that the claimant, or one acting on the claimant's behalf, relied on an express war-
ranty made by the manufacturer or its agent about a material fact or facts concern-
ing the product and this express warranty proved to be untrue.
Id Cf. U.C.C. § 2-313, 2-315 (setting out provisions for express and implied warranties).




tive defense." 52 The rule's reference to the existing body of product liabil-
ity law suggests that evidence of manufacture equivalent with the state of
the art should be permitted to show use of reasonable care53 or that the
product is not defective.54 Parenthetically, the evanescence of state of the
art issues, and the difficulty in fixing a state of manufacturing art suitable
for a product safety standard, are yet other reasons for the paucity of stan-
dards petitions and standards activity by the Commission. For example, in
contemplating different enforcement alternatives with regard to residential
smoke detectors, the Commission's General Counsel concurred in the staff
recommendation not to issue a product safety standard for several reasons,
one of which was that "the state of the art seems to be still evolving, raising
the possibility that a mandatory standard could become outdated."55
3. The National Commission on Product Safety and the Legislative
History
The term "product defect" was given great reach by the National Com-
mission on Product Safety (NCPS), which stated in its Final Report that a
"defect may be in the design, construction, packaging or warnings and di-
rections for use."56 The NCPS bill did not, however, define "defect" and
instead authorized the proposed Commission "to promulgate regulations
defining 'defect which creates a substantial risk of personal injury to the
public.' ""
The ensuing Senate bill, S. 3419, would have imposed the duty to notify
the Administrator of all defects, but limited the remedy of notice to the
public to "manufacturing" defects.58 As to design defects, the Senate
Commerce Committee Report explained: "If a design defect were to pres-
ent an unreasonable risk of injury or death, the Commissioner could pro-
ceed under authority of Section 311 to remove immediately the product
from the marketplace or could resort to the standard-setting procedures
contained in the bill."' 9 Section 15(a) of the House amendments 60 struck
out the qualification that a defect be associated with the product's manu-
52. See Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals, The State of the Art Defense, 43 ALB.
L. REV. 941, 944 (1979), and cases cited therein. See generally Note, The State of the Art
Defense in Strict Products Liability, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 649 (1974).
53. E.g., Olsen v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972).
54. E.g., Mondshour v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. IIl (D. Md. 1969).
55. CPSC Briefing Materials on Residential Smoke Detectors I (April 3, 1980).
56. NCPS Final Report at 75.
57. Consumer Product Safety Bill Proposed by National Commission on Product
Safety, reprinted in THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT § 16(b) (1973).
58. S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 313(b) (1972).
59. S. REP. No. 749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1972).
60. H.R. 15003, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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facture,6' and the "manufacturing" limitation was not included in the
Consumer Product Safety Act as passed.
C "Substantial Risk of Injury"
I In General
Not all defects are reportable; rather only those which, for any reason,
create a "substantial risk of injury to the public" need be reported. While
the questions (1) "how widespread"? and (2) "how severe"? are central to
the section 15 inquiry, section 15(a)(2) contemplates that a safety problem
does not have to be both widespread and severe to be reportable. The
Commission has concluded in its interpretations62 that "[elven one defec-
tive product can present a substantial ri3k of injury. . . if the injury which
might occur is serious and/or if the injury is likely to occur. 63
61. Senator Eagleton criticized the manufacturing defect-design defect distinction in the
Senate debate on S. 3419, stating:
We need only look to our recent experience with safety-related defects in
automobiles to see that any effective product safety program must provide ade-
quate remedies for all safety-related defects, whether they are technically deemed
"manufacturing" or "design" related. Some of the most serious safety defects
found in cars have related to design ....
I would also stress the fact that no other product safety legislation of which I am
aware-including the statutes which now regulate automobile safety and the safety
of products with a potential radiation hazard-make a distinction between manu-
facturing and design defects. These laws go to any safety defect when it presents a
sufficient danger to justify action. Nor does the proposed legislation of the Com-
mission on Product Safety, after which the pending legislation is modeled, make
such a distinction.
It is clear to me, however, that more attention should be focused on this point.
For the reasons I am about to set out, neither the standard setting procedure nor
the emergency injunctive authority under section 311 provide an effective alterna-
tive for defectively designed products which are already on the market.
118 CONG. REC. 21901 (1972).
62. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(f)(i)(ii) (1980).
63. Thus, for example, in the case of White Consolidated Industries, Inc. (kelvinator),
CPSC Docket No. 75-1 (initial decision) (Nov. 3, 1975), involving a defect in refrigerator
defrost terminals which under some circumstances could cause arcing and heat buildup,
Commissioner Constance Newman, sitting as administrative law judge, found the defrost
terminals to be defective, but further found that in most circumstances the defect created no
hazard. Summarizing § 15(a)(2), Commissioner Newman stated that in order to resolve
whether there is evidence to support the contention that a proven defect creates a substantial
risk of injury to the public: "it is necessary to consider in toto: (1) the probability of the
defect existing in a given product; (2) the number of defective products in distribution; and
(3) the severity of the risk." Id at 62.
The Commission staff has taken the position that the § 15(a)(2) criteria should be consid-
ered disjunctively. In their memorandum to the Commission, Commission staff members
Catherine C. Cook and William F. Kitzes wrote:
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The phrase "substantial risk of injury" appears only in section 15 and
suggests a standard different from that of "unreasonable risk" of injury,
the terminology used elsewhere in the CPSA.64 The difference between
these standards needs to be explored.65 For two principal reasons it can
be inferred that "substantial product hazard" connotes a higher level of
In section 15, Congress has enumerated several factors to be considered by the
Commission in deciding whether the public exposure to a hazard is substantial, i.e.,
extensive enough to make notice and recall action under section 15 appropriate.
The statute does not state explicitly how extensive the public exposure need be
before notice and recall are appropriate. Instead it suggests ways in which expo-
sure may be measured and substantiality determined, enumerates some of these
ways in the disjunctive, and indicates that all relevant evidence should be consid-
ered.
Cook-Kitzes Memorandum, supra note 35, at 4 (emphasis added).
64. Consumer Product Safety Act §§ 7, 8, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056, 2057, 2061 (1976).
65. The dictionary defines substantial as "considerable in quantity; significantly large;"
while defining unreasonable as "exceeding the bounds of reason or moderation." Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary 1153, 1273 (1980).
In determining whether the risk of injury is sufficient to render a defective product a
substantial product hazard, the rules state that the Commission and staff will consider:
The utility of the product involved; the nature of the risk of injury which the prod-
uct presents; the necessity for the product; the population exposed to the product
and its risk of injury; the Commission's own experience and expertise; the case law
interpreting Federal and State public health and safety statutes; the case law in the
area of products liability; and other factors relevant to the determination.
16 C.F.R. § 1115.4(e) (1980).
Reference to earlier safety legislation provides some guidance as to the meaning of "sub-
stantial" as it related to "injury." The prior regulations under the Federal Hazardous Sub-
stances Act define a hazardous substance as a product which "may cause substantial
personal injury or substantial illness." The regulations further define a "substantial" injury
or illness as "any injury or illness of a significant nature. It need not be severe or serious.
What is excluded by the word 'substantial' is a wholly insignificant or negligible injury or
illness." 16 C.F.R. § 1500.3(c)(7)(ii) (1974).
The Environmental Protection Agency imposes notification requirements for § 8(e) of the
Toxic Substances Control Act comparable to those under the CPSA. In its February 24,
1978 Statement of Interpretation and Enforcement Policy, the Administrator defined a "sub-
stantial risk of injury to health or the environment" as "a risk of considerable concern be-
cause of (a) the seriousness of the effect . . . and (b) the fact or probability of its
occurrence." 43 Fed. Reg. 11,110-11 (1978).
Section 313(b) of the Senate bill, S. 3419, confined its provisions to products evidencing an
"unreasonable risk of injury," and authorized the "Administrator" to require public notice
"[i]f any consumer product fails to comply with any applicable order issued pursuant to this
title and thereby presents an unreasonable risk of injury or death or has a defect which
causes it to present an unreasonable risk of injury or death." S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972).
The House version, H.R. 15003, recast obligations in terms of a "substantial hazard to the
public" and imposed reporting duties upon covered firms discovering a "substantial product
hazard," defined at § 15(a)(2) as:
(1) a failure to comply with the applicable consumer product safety rule which
creates a substantial hazard to the public, or
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the number of defec-
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product safety deficiency than that underlying an "unreasonable" risk of
injury. First, by defining a substantial product hazard as applicable only
to violations of product safety rules (by definition designed to eliminate an
tive products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates
a substantial hazard to the public.
H.R. 15003, 92d Cong., 2d Sesg. (1972).
In its Final Report, the NCPS discussed evaluation of risk in these terms (while styling its
comments as "Evaluating Hazards"):
In assessing individual hazards, we studied data relating frequency, severity, du-
ration, and sequelae of injury to the frequency and degree of exposure to the prod-
uct. Other variables we looked at were the degree of inherent risk, the essentiality
of the product, and the feasibilty and approximate cost of safety improvements.
We also considered whether there were acceptable alternatives for a hazardous
product; effects on the product of aging and weather; the contribution to hazards of
defective maintenance and repair; exposure to instructions or warnings; influence
of product advertising on behavior; the extent and forms of abnormal uses of the
product; effects of storage, distribution, and disposal; and characteristics of the per-
sons injured, including age, sex, skills, training, and experience.
NCPS Final Report at 10.
Later in its Report, NCPS described its method for evaluation of data:
Decisions as to which risk can and should be abated depend both on data and
value judgments.
These decisions depend also on such human factors as personal experience and
motivation, public opinion, and ease of administration.
In general, apart from technical information, the data to consider in setting pri-




Potential for hazard reduction
Awareness of hazard by consumer
Increase of hazard by age of product
Hazard to nonuser
Psychological impact of injury
The interaction among these factors requires some system of weighing each.
In appraising the importance of a product hazard, it is essential to determine that
the product itself is the main risk factor. High on the physicians' list of consumer
products linked to head injuries with possible chronic effects are bicycles, play-
ground equipment, and, in person, baseball or football equipment. But the bicycle
is not to blame for environmental hazards such as steep grades, loose road surfaces,
or the lack of paths exclusively for pedal pushers. The playground cannot be
blamed each time a child totters. By itself, a ball is harmless: the game does the
damages.
NCPS Final Report at 43.
Later, in a discussion of acceptable levels of risk, the Final Report states:
If the degree of risk could be calculated for each product, the consumer might
decide its acceptability for himself, but he would not have the right to say that his
risk is acceptable to everyone.
Presumably, the acceptable risk will vary with the product, its utility, necessity,
and inherent dangers.
NCPS Final Report at 70.
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unreasonable risk of injury) which in addition constitute a substantial
product hazard, section 15 suggests that a finding of substantial product
hazard may frequently involve a higher degree of risk of injury than sim-
ple failure of the -product to meet a product safety standard. Secondly, the
fact that the extraordinary remedies of recall, repair, replacement, and re-
fund available to the Commission under section 15, as well as the fact that
section 15 remedies can reach back to products already in the consumers'
hands-while product bans and product safety standards only apply pro-
spectively-further supports the conclusion that Congress intended that
section 15 remedies only be invoked upon finding a risk of injury more
significant than that for simple "unreasonable" risks. For these reasons,
congressional use of the phrase "substantial risk of injury," unique to sec-
tion 15, must, if it is to mean anything at all, contemplate a more severe
injury, and a greater likelihood of injury, than that necessary to create an
"unreasonable" risk of injury.66
The question of substantiality turns on evaluation of the four criteria of
section 15(a)(2): "pattern of defect, the number of defective products dis-
tributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise."6 7 Although
the Commission must show that a product does present a substantial prod-
uct hazard to order remedies under section 15(c) and (d), firms must report
if the safety problem could create a substantial product hazard. Taken
together, the use of the term "could," the additional section 15(b)(2) re-
quirement of "immediate" reporting, and the Commission's repeated ad-
monition that firms should report even if in doubt as to the nature and
magnitude of a safety problem,68 suggest that the threshold risk determina-
tion which triggers section 15 obligations may be lower than-and should
in any event be more prompt than-the risk determination which accom-
panies promulgation of a section 7 standard or a section 8 ban.69 Reflect-
66. See Note, The Consumer Product Safety Act. Risk Classification and Products Liabil-
ity, 8 IND. L. REV. 846, 850 (1975). Taking the contrary position, one commentator compar-
ing § 15 with § 12 has stated that "although the determinations to be made in the two
proceedings are somewhat different, the element of unreasonable risk is common to both
.... Comparisons of Section 15's 'substantial risk' language with other sections' 'unrea-
sonable risk' standards are only instructive up to a point in assessing a firm's obligation to
report." Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 899, 944-45 (1973).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(2) (1976).
68. See 43 Fed. Reg. 34,991 (1978); 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4(e) (1980).
69. As the Commission's regulations explain:
The Commission considered incorporating the term unreasonable risk but on bal-
ance rejected the commenters' suggestion. Within this agency the term unreasona-
ble risk has taken on a special meaning in the agency's proceedings under Sections
7 and 8 of the CPSA to promulgate CPSA standards and bans. The Commission
does not want to give the impression that the extensive cost/benefit analysis in
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ing this view that hazard information which is insufficient to support a ban
or a standard may nevertheless be reportable information under section
15, the Commission staff has stated that a Commission decision not to ini-
tiate a standard setting procedure for a class of products will not excuse an
individual manufacturer from the reporting requirements of section
15(b).7°
2. To the Public
The statute does not specifically state the degree of public exposure nec-
essary to raise a product hazard to the level of substantial risk "to the
public." It does, however, give some guidance by providing factors to be
weighed in assessing substantiality. Section 15(a)(2) includes "the number
of defective products distributed in commerce" as one factor. 7, Accord-
ingly, the Commission's regulations include "the population exposed to
the product and its risk of injury" as criteria to be considered in determin-
ing "whether the risk of injury associated with the product is the type of
risk which will render the product defective."72
It would thus seem probable that the exposure of only one person to a
product hazard would not satisfy the section 15(a)(2) requirement that the
exposure be "to the public."73 The regulations nevertheless clearly state
which it engages before promulgating a standard or ban should be undertaken by
subject firms before reporting under Section 15(b) of the CPSA.
43 Fed. Reg. 34,991 (1978).
70. The Commission Office of the General Counsel so advised the Commission after
the Commission's decision not to undertake standards development for aerosol products.
Following industry statements that the Commission's decision not to proceed obviated the
need for possible future § 15(b) reports, the Office of the General Counsel submitted an
opinion letter to the Society of Cosmetic Chemists which restated the criteria which will
trigger a duty to report a substantial product hazard, and advised further that while aerosol
products as a class may not create an unreasonable risk of injury to consumers, an individ-
ual aerosol product might. CPSA Advisory Opinion No. 224 (Oct. 7, 1975).
71. The Committee report on H.R. 15003 stated that the substantiality of the risk of
injury turned on "the extent of public exposure to the hazard." H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972). The Committee Report also keyed the degree of public exposure to
the distribution requirement of § 15(a)(2), stating: "This definition looks to the extent of the
public exposure to the hazard. A few defective products will not normally provide a proper
basis for compelling notification under this section."
72. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4(e) (1980).
73. Compare the § 15 focus on exposure to the public to the reporting requirements of
§ 9 of the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act, 42 U.S.C. § 263(b)-263(n) (1976),
which are triggered by a risk of injury "to any person." That act, which requires firms to
report a defect relating to safety of use, or the failure to comply with an applicable standard,
also provides for exemptions from the public notice and repair or replacement provisions of
that act only on a showing "that such defect or failure to comply is not such as to create a




that "[elven one defective product can present a substantial risk of injury
. . . if the injury which might occur is serious and/or if the injury is likely
to occur,"74 and further advise that in certain circumstances a firm should
report even before public exposure can be evaluated. "Since the extent of
public exposure and/or the likelihood or seriousness of the injury are ordi-
narily not known at the time a defect first manifests itself, subject firms are
urged to report if in doubt as to whether a defect could present a substan-
tial product hazard.""
3. Pattern of Defect
The regulations, intended to guide staff evaluation of a "pattern of de-
fect," are instructive for firms assessing the scope of a safety related prob-
lem.76 More significantly, for firms which might be subject to section 15
reporting or remedial requirements, the pattern of defect may have some
effect on which part of the total gets reported or recalled. If the pattern is
clear-for example, 500 products of a 2,500 item production run present a
safety problem-less than all need be reported or remedied. The regula-
tions provide that in assaying the pattern of defect, the Commission and
the staff "will consider whether the defect arises from the design, composi-
tion, contents, construction, finish, packaging, warnings, or instructions of
the product or from some other cause and will consider the conditions
under which the defect manifests itself.",7
7
Additional insight into the staffs interpretation of a pattern of defect can
be gained from a memorandum issued by the Commission's Product De-
fect Corrective Division which sets guidelines and procedures for imple-
menting the reporting requirements. 78 This CEPD memorandum lists the
following factors to be considered: "(a) the ways in which the product may
be used or misused; (b) the ways in which the product was manufactured,
including techniques employed in quality control; (c) the time in product
life at which the defect manifests itself; (d) the physical environment (e.g.,
geographic area, atmospheric conditions) in which the defect manifests if-
self."79
74. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(t)(1)(ii) (1980).
75. Id § 1115.4(e).
76. Id § 1115.12(0(1).
77. Id § 1115.12(f)(1)(i).
78. Memorandum from Catherine Cook to the Commission, Internal Procedures to Im-
plement Section 15 of CPSA (Jan. 16, 1979) [hereinafter cited as CEPD Memorandum]. For
the recent reorganization of CEPD functions, see note 159 infra.
79. CEPD Memorandum, attachment I at 5.
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4. The Number of Defective Products Distributed in Commerce
The Commission's regulations interpret the "number of defective prod-
ucts" criteria of section 15(a)(2) in such a way that even a single product
may create a substantial product hazard if the potential injury is severe,
and the potential for injury is great.8" The House Commerce Committee
Report on H.R. 15003 phrases the distribution requirement somewhat dif-
ferently from the Commission's rules, placing more emphasis on distribu-
tion than on the nature of the hazard associated with a particular
product.8
Tracking the Commission's overall emphasis on early reporting, the
CEPD Memorandum makes it quite clear that the Commission staff will
not (and, impliedly, that reporting firms should not) delay a hazard deter-
mination "until such time as it can establish accurate distribution figures
or ascertain to a certainty the number of defective or potentially defective
products manufactured."8 "
5. Severity of the Risk
The regulations describe the Commission's interpretation of "severity of
the risk"83 as congruent with its interpretation of the "number of defective
80. Number of defective products distributed in commerce. Even one defective
product can present a substantial risk of injury and provide a basis for a substantial
product hazard determination under Section 15 of CPSA if the injury which might
occur is serious and/or if the injury is likely to occur. However, a few defective
products with no potential for causing serious injury and little likelihood of injur-
ing even in a minor way will not ordinarily provide a proper basis for substantial
product hazard determination.
16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(f)(i)(ii) (1980).
81. "This definition [of substantial product hazard] looks to the extent of the public
exposure to the hazard. A few defective products will not normally provide a proper basis
for compelling notification under this section." H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 42
(1972). The House Commerce Committee's use of the phrase "not normally" arguably may
be reconciled with the Commission's imposition of Section 15(b) requirements for "[elven
one defective product" where "the injury which might occur is serious and/or if the injury is
likely to occur."
82. CEPD Memorandum, attachment I at 5-6. This emphasis on early reporting is con-
sistent with the explanatory comments to the 1978 regulations: "The Commission does not
want to give the impression that the extensive cost/benefit analysis in which it engages
before promulgating a standard or ban should be undertaken by subject firms before report-
ing under section 15(b) of the CPSA." 43 Fed. Reg. 34,991 (1978).
83. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(f)(1)(iii) (1980):
A risk is severe if the injury which might occur is serious and/or if the injury is
likely to occur. In considering the likelihood of any injury the Commission and
the staff will consider the number of injuries reported to have occurred, the in-
tended or reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the product, and the population
group exposed to the product (e.g., children, elderly, handicapped).
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products" language, stating that a risk will be considered severe where ei-
ther the potential injury is serious or it is likely to occur. Additionally,
special attention will be directed towards any foreseeable misuse of the
product, and whether children, elderly, or handicapped persons are ex-
posed to the products. 84
CEPD considers the severity of the risk "the most important of the fac-
tors considered in determining preliminarily whether a defect presents a
substantial risk of injury. '85 The CEPD memorandum states that both the
seriousness of the potential injury and the likelihood of its occurrence are
to be considered together in determining overall risk severity: "[B]oth a
product which can but is unlikely to cause serious injury and a product
which is highly likely to cause slight injury might indicate a severe risk of
injury.",86 To assist in these evaluations, the staff has written a "severity
index" for injury classifications,87 which classifies injuries on a spectrum
ranging from amputation to an ankle sprain. 88
6. Other Considerations
Section 15(a)(2) does not describe the "otherwise" criteria in substantial
product hazard determinations. The rules simply state that in addition to
the four specific factors of section 15(a)(2), "[T]he Commission and staff
will consider all other relevant factors."89 As stated above, the Commis-
sion's comments on the section 15 regulations make it clear that it will
refer to "the broadest meaning found in Federal and State statutes and in
judicial pronouncements." 90
84. Id
85. CEPD Memorandum, attachment 1 at 6.
86. CEPD Memorandum at 7.
87. Id
88. To the 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(f)(l)(iii) (1980) criteria for determining the likelihood of
injury, the CEPD Memorandum adds:
In assessing the likelihood of injury, Compliance and Enforcement also considers
where the product is or might be used and whether warning signals are given
before the product presents a risk of injury. Based on these factors, the staff deter-
mines whether injury from a consumer's exposure to a defective product is highly
likely, likely, not improbable, highly unlikely, or improbable. CEPD Memoran-
dum at 7.
On January 19, 1981, the Commission adopted on an experimental basis staff
procedures whereby the staff, when it makes a preliminary determination that a
product presents a substantial product hazard, is required to place the product into
one of three hazard priority categories based on likelihood and severity of harm.
89. 16 C.F.R. § lll5.12(f)(1)(ii) (1980).
90. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,991 (Aug. 7, 1980).
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D. Case Law Construing "Substantial Product Hazard"
Administrative decisions in section 15 actions shed at least some light on
the Commission's interpretation of what represents a "substantial product
hazard." In Kelvinator,9 Commissioner Newman, sitting as the presiding
officer, found that although certain refrigerator defrost terminals were de-
fective, the defect did not create a substantial risk of injury to the public
and therefore did not represent a substantial product hazard. Commis-
sioner Newman based this conclusion on several determinations: (1) evi-
dence that a series of circumstances necessary to create the defect were
unlikely to appear; (2) enforcement counsel's failure to show there were
any reported injuries involving the approximately 270,000 refrigerators in
question; (3) evidence that the refrigerator's insulation was self-extinguish-
ing; (4) and evidence that the refrigerator would shut down or a fuse would
blow before a dangerous condition would be created.92
In another section 15 action, Francis Alonso, Jr. (Mylar Star Kites) ,9 the
Administrative Law Judge weighed the allegation that long-tailed alumi-
nized kites posed a hazard of electrocution if they came into contact with
high voltage lines. Evidence showed the near electrocution of one kite
flyer and incidents of damage to parked cars and residences after the alu-
minized kites contacted and damaged high voltage conductors.
The manufacturer defended the kite's safety by showing that the kites
were sold with the written warning: "Never fly your dragon, or any other
kite, near power lines or during wet weather. If the kite should land on or
near electrical lines, contact local authorities immediately; do not attemp t]
to remove the kite yourself."94 The manufacturer further claimed that the
probability of injury or property damage was so statistically remote as to
be negligible.
In concluding that the kites represented a substantial product hazard,
the ALJ rejected as insufficient the manufacturer's offer to add an addi-
tional warning label to the kites and to distribute warning literature, ob-
serving: "[t]here is no guarantee that adequate instructions against flying
kites near power lines will invariably be obeyed, even by adults."'95
The Commission set aside the initial decision on jurisdictional grounds,
91. Kelvinator, supra note 63.
92. Id. at 78-91.
93. 1 CONS. PROD. SAF. REP. (CCH) 75,109 (Initial Decision) (1976), Proposed Order
set aside on other grounds, [1977-1979 Transfer Binder] CONS. PROD. SAP. DEC. (CCH)
75,155.





but affirmed the AL's findings of fact concerning the existence of a sub-
stantial product hazard. In a discussion which doubtless affected the Com-
mission's later reference (in its final regulations) to the risk-utility
evaluation of metalicized kites, the Commission concluded that the purely
aesthetic value of an aluminized surface, with no compensating benefit to
the kite's performance sufficient to justify the risk, was insufficient to miti-
gate against a finding of substantial product hazard.96
In Relco, Inc. (Wel-Dex Welder Mfg. Co.) , the Commission Notice of
Enforcement alleged that an arc welder's "electrical output is not isolated
from the input by a transformer. . . so that electricity of the same strength
is present at the welder probes as at the electrical source"; that "the electri-
cal terminals are located on the outside of the welder" presenting the risk
of shock; that the electric cord was not of sufficient size to carry the current
and could as well be cut by the welder's sharp edges; and that the uninsu-
lated metal housing tended to overheat.98 The Commission affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's finding that the Wel-Dex Electric Arc Welder
had design and performance defects which could cause electric shock,
burns, or fires, creating a substantial product hazard.
IV. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
A. What Products Are Covered?
Section 15 applies to all "consumer products." '99 The Commission has
96. As the record below shows, these aluminized kites contain a serious defect
because the design incorporates a conductive material which is capable of trans-
mitting a lethal electric current to a person in contact with the kite. This aluminum
surface does not add to the flying capability of the kite but merely adds to its
aesthetic value. The Commission therefore believes that because of the nature and
severity of the risk, without an offsetting benefit sufficient to justify the risk, a prod-
uct such as this if properly the subject of a proceeding under the CPSA would
present a substantial product hazard.
Francis Alonso Jr. (Mylar Star Kites), 2 CoNs. PROD. SAF. GUIDE (CCH) 75,155 at 60,290
(1977).
To the manufacturer's argument that other toys, including non-metalicized kites and wire
controlled airplanes pose a comparable risk of creating an arc with overhead lines, the Com-
mission stated: "Even if such contentions were demonstrated, we do not believe that we are
obligated to act against every product that may pose a similar hazard in order to act against
one that the record establishes is a hazard." Id
97. 1 CoNs. PROD. SAF. GUIDE (CCH) 75,121 (1976).
98. Interim Initial Decision and Order, CPSC Docket No. 74-4 (April 29, 1975).
99. Consumer products are defined by the Act to include:
any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a
consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a
school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or
enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or
residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise; ....
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taken the position that section 15 obligations attach to products manufac-
tured before the May 14, 1973 effective date of the Act."° Additionally,
the Commission staff has construed the reach of its jurisdiction to mean
that even where a manufacturer has ceased production of the product there
may be sufficient evidence of a substantial product hazard to require a
section 15(b) report. °'
B. Who Must Report?
Section 15(b) imposes reporting requirements upon "[e]very manufac-
turer of a consumer product distributed in commerce, and every distribu-
tor and retailer of such product." Importers are included in the section
3(a)(4) definition of "manufacturers" as "any person who manufactures or
imports a consumer product."'0 2 The regulations make it clear that im-
porters are subject to section 15(b) reporting requirements. 0 3
As will be discussed more fully below, firms which have received report-
able information must file an Initial Report."° Manufacturers and im-
porters must also file a subsequent Full Report.0 5 Distributors or retailers
who are neither manufacturers nor importers of the products in question
are subject to the reporting requirements of section 15(b) but can satisfy
their notification obligations by complying with the less comprehensive re-
porting requirements of an Initial Report.16
CPSA § 3(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (1976).
100. Advisory Opinion No. 120 (June 26, 1974). The correctness of the General Coun-
sel's conclusion that § 15 can be applied retroactively is not free from doubt. Generally, a
law is presumed to apply only prospectively, Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938), and
will not be given retrospective application absent a clear expression of legislative intent.
Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935). As the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit stated: "statutes are not to be applied retroactively 'unless
the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to
them or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.'" De Rodulfa
v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Neither the language of the Act nor the legislative history suggest that Congress intended
retroactive application. In addition, the Act's specification that its operative provisions take
effect 60 days after enactment suggests the contrary conclusion-that Congress intended
only prospective application.
101. The Office of the General Counsel so stated in its Advisory Opinion No. 146 (Octo-
ber 25, 1974), determining that following a manufacturer's earlier notification, recall and
repair campaign, the manufacturer's subsequent receipt of 12 guaranty registration cards
and one report of personal injury demonstrated that the product was still being sold.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(4) (1976).
103. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.3(0 (1980).
104. Id § 1115.13(c).
105. Id § 1115.13(d).
106. Id. § 1115.13(b).
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C When is a Product Distributed in Commerce?
Reporting obligations under section 15(b) are triggered by product non-
compliance or the existence of a substantial product hazard in any con-
sumer product "distributed in commerce." Section 3(a)(l 1) of the Act
states that "[tihe terms 'to distribute in commerce' and 'distribution in
commerce' means to sell in commerce, to introduce or deliver for introduc-
tion into commerce, or to hold for sale or distribution after introduction
into commerce." 7
By including importers within the definition of manufacturers, section
3(a)(4) brings imports within the compass of section 15(b) reporting obli-
gations. Accordingly, the Commission's section 15 regulations expressly
include importers within the definition of "subject firm[s]."' 8
The regulations leave it unclear whether products not yet in channels of
commerce, i e., products still in the plant, may nonetheless create an obli-
gation to report under section 15. The prefatory comments to the 1974
section 15 regulations indicated that notification, reporting, or corrective
action would not be required where a defective or noncomplying product
has not left the plant:
For the purposes of [the 1974 regulations under section 15] a
manufacturer who corrects a defect in a consumer product or a
failure of a consumer product to comply with an applicable con-
sumer product safety rule while all units of such product are still
within his plant need not comply with the notification require-
ments of the act.' 09
There is, however, no comparable limitation in the 1978 regulations or
accompanying comments.
D. When Does 4 Company "Obtain Information"?
Two factors bear on when a company has "obtained information": (1)
who in the company must know a fact before knowledge of it can be im-
puted to the company, and (2) how much time can elapse before the com-
pany will be presumed to know what its employees know.
As to the first point, a firm is presumed to know of product safety related
107. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(I1) (1976).
108. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.3(0 (1980).
109. See § 313(a) of Senate bill S. 3419, which imposed notification requirements only
where the product "has left the place of manufacture." Similarly, H.R. 8157, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 16(a) (1971) (introduced by Rep. Moss), would have imposed notification require-
ments only "if such product has left the place of manufacture." S. 283, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972) (introduced by Sen. Magnuson), imposed reporting requirements on a manufacturer
having information "tending to show" that a consumer product which had left the place of
manufacture "contains a defect which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public."
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information when that information is received by a company official or
employee capable of understanding its significance. "o No matter which
employee first learns of product safety related information, the firm will be
presumed to have learned of it within five days of that employee's receiv-
ing the information."'
The Commission's explanatory comments to the 1978 rules justify the
imputation provision under both section 20(c) of the Act and common law
agency principles. 1 2 Section 20(c) provides that anyone knowingly violat-
ing the prohibited acts section is subject to civil penalties, and "know-
ingly" is defined to mean "the presumed having of knowledge deemed to
be possessed by a reasonable man who acts in the circumstances, including
knowledge obtainable upon the exercise of due care to ascertain the truth
of representations."' 13 In relying on common law agency principles, the
Commission recites the established rule imputing to the principal knowl-
edge known to the agent "where the agent has actual or apparent authority
to act on behalf of the principal."'"
110. 16C.F.R.§ 1115.11(a)(1980).
111. Id § I I15.14(b). In its July 22, 1977 proposed rules the Commission staff deleted as
unnecessary a draft clause which "imputed to the firm the knowledge it would have if it had
acted reasonably and diligently to collect and analyze this information." Mana Jennings
Memorandum to Commission, Proposed Revision of Section 15 Regulations at 3 (July 22,
1977), reprinted in PLI COURSE HANDBOOK, supra note 35.
112. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,992 (1978).
113. See note 18 supra.
114. 45 Fed. Reg. 34,992 (1978). Notwithstanding its adherence to common law imputa-
tion standards, only a firm's chief executive officer can execute a § 15(b) report unless that
task has been delegated in writing to another employee. 16 C.F.R. § 11 15.13(a) (1980).
In its preliminary comments to the 1978 rules the Commission sought to allay some com-
menters' fears that a disaffected or uninformed employee might not pass on potentially de-
fect-related information to an individual with reporting responsibility. The Commission
addressed this concern with this comment:
If a subject firm faced with a civil penalty action for failure to report could show
that an employee intentionally refused to pass relevant information to the subject
firm and if the Commission based its case upon the subject firm's having actual
knowledge of that same information from that particular employee, the Commis-
sion could not rely upon the first portion of section 20(c), that is, the having of
actual knowledge. The Commission would then have to prove that the informa-
tion otherwise available to the subject firm, irrespective of the withheld informa-
tion, was sufficient to put a reasonable person in the position of the subject firm on
notice of the information. The net result of the failure of the employee to pass the
information on would be to increase the burden on the Commission and to provide
the subject firm with a possible defense in a civil penalty action.
The Commission would consider the failure of the employee to pass on hazard-
related information as a mitigating circumstance in an appropriate case (although,
as stated above, the continuing violation after receipt of a notice of noncompliance
would weigh heavily against a subject firm). In addition, the regulation has been
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The Commission's comments recognize, however, that the five-day im-
putation period is a "guideline in the context of an interpretive rule," and
that as such, "the reasonableness and due diligence of a subject firm, given
the circumstances of a particular case, will be determinative, not the lan-
guage of the rule.""'
E When Does Information "Reasonably Support the Conclusion" That a
Substantial Product Hazard May Exist?
A firm must immediately, i e., within 24 hours, report information which
reasonably supports the conclusion that a substantial product hazard may
exist. 16 In recognition of the weight attached to different types of product
safety related information, the rules set out certain information which, in
the Commission's view, constitutes information which reasonably supports
the conclusion that a report is necessary." 7 As a result, such information
must ordinarily be immediately reported to the Commission. Other cate-
gories of information which are of uncertain substantiality must neverthe-
less be probed to determine if they "reasonably support the conclusion"
that a substantial product hazard may exist.' 18
I. Information Which Should be Reported
A subject firm must immediately report information which indicates
amended to reflect that the reportable information must reach an employee capa-
ble of understanding its significance; thus, if the disgruntled employee were a cash-
ier or stocker, there would be less likelihood that the Commission would deem that
person capable of appreciating the significance of the information than if the per-
son were the product safety officer of the subject firm or some other presumptively
responsible corporate official.
43 Fed. Reg. 34,992-93 (1978).
Thus, 16 C.F.R. § 1115.11(b) (1980) provides:
In evaluating whether or when a subject firm should have reported, the Commis-
sion will deem a subject firm to know what a reasonable person acting in the cir-
cumstances in which the firm finds itself would know. Thus, the subject firm shall
be deemed to know what it would have known if it had exercised due care to
ascertain the truth of complaints or other representations. This includes the
knowledge a firm would have if it conducted a reasonably expeditious investiga-
tion in order to evaluate the reportability of a death or grievous bodily injury or
other information.
See also 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14 (1980).
115. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,992 (1978).
116. Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1976); 16 C.F.R.
§ 1115.14(e) (1980).
117. Examples of the kind of information required are set out in 16 C.F.R § 1115.12
(1980). Reports must be made to the Commission's Product Defect Corrective Division,
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, D. C. 20207, (301) 492-6608.
118. 16 C.F.R § 1115.12(a)-ll15.12(e) (1980).
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"that a noncompliance or a defect in a consumer product has caused, may
have caused, or contributed to the causing, or could cause or contribute to
the causing of a death or grievous bodily injury"" 9 unless the firm has
"investigated and determined that the information is not reportable."' 20
Of course, even in the absence of a death or grievous bodily injury, the
rules state that "other information may indicate a reportable defect or non-
compliance," and that the subject firm may be held responsible for knowl-
edge which could be derived by a "reasonable and prudent manufac-
turer."' 2
2. Information Which Should be Studied and Evaluated
The regulations offer specific illustrations of the types of information a
firm should consider in deciding whether or not to report. These include
information concerning:
engineering, quality control, or production data ...safety-re-
lated production or design change(s) . . . [piroduct liability
suit(s) ... independent testing laboratory [results] ...com-
plaint(s) from a consumer or consumer group. . . [i]nformation
119. Id § 1115.12(c). The regulations set out the following examples of grievous bodily
injury: "mutilation, amputation/dismemberment, disfigurement, loss of important bodily
functions, debilitating internal disorders, severe burns, severe electrical shocks, and injuries
likely to require extended hospitalization." Id
120. Id The Commission originally proposed a section which stated that certain infor-
mation was presumed to be reportable. Under the proposed rule, information that a product
was involved in a death or grievous bodily injury, absent "clear evidence" to the contrary,
was presumptively reportable within 10 days of the mishap. 42 Fed. Reg. 46,720, 46,723
(1977). In the Federal Register notice of March 30, 1978, the Commission observed that the
"basic idea" underlying this section was to encourage firms to investigate serious accidents
in order to determine whether a substantial product hazard might be present. 43 Fed. Reg.
13,393, 13,395 (1978).
In proposing the final § 15 rule revisions, the staff considered establishing a blanket rule
that a Section 15 report must be filed whenever information of a death or serious bodily
injury was received. See Cook Memorandum, supra note 33, at 4; Freeston Memorandum,
supra note 33, at 8. The reasoning advanced was that stich a requirement would eliminate
the "legalese" of weighing any presumption. Commenters urged that such a mandate would
ignore the language of § 15(b), which speaks of "information which reasonably supports the
conclusion" that a product presents a substantial product hazard. Based on the comments it
received, the Commission deleted the proposed presumption, directing instead that informa-
tion suggesting that noncompliance or a defect may have caused death or serious bodily
injury must be investigated and reported if causally related to the injury. 16 C.F.R.
§ 1115.12(c) (1980). See 43 Fed. Reg. 34,993 (1978).
121. "In evaluating whether or when a subject firm should have reported, the Commis-
sion will deem a subject firm to know what a reasonable and prudent manufacturer (includ-
ing an importer) distributor, or retailer would know. (See § 1115.11)." 16 C.F.R.
§ 1115.12(d) (1980).
In addition, of course, the fact that a product fails to comply with a standard or ban must
immediately be reported to the CPSC under § 15(b). 16 C.F.R. § 1115.2(b) (1980).
[Vol. 30:195
Substantial Product Hazards
received from the Commission or another governmental agency
.. . [or] information received from other firms, including re-
quests to return a product or for replacement or credit.' 22
The latter, the regulations provide, "includes both requests made by dis-
tributors and retailers to the manufacturer and requests from the manufac-
turer that products be returned."' 23
Unless the information is clearly reportable, the firm can spend a rea-
sonable time, not to exceed ten days, for investigation and evaluation. Rec-
ognizing that reportable information may be sketchy or unconfirmed, the
rules permit reports to be made with disclaimers. 24
F When Must Reports Be Submitted and How Will the Commission
Respond to Late Reports?
Initial reports must be filed "[ilmmediately after a subject firm has ob-
tained information which reasonably supports the conclusion" that a prod-
uct "fails to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule or
contains a defect which could create a substantial risk of injury to the pub-
lic.' 125 The regulations further define "immediately" as "within 24
hours." ' 26 Initial reports which are not in writing must be confirmed in
writing within forty-eight hours of the nonwritten report.127
Where the subject firm learns of a death, grievous bodily injury, or other
possibly reportable information, the regulations state that the firm must
investigate and evaluate the information within ten days unless the firm
"can demonstrate that a longer period is reasonable."' 2' The Commission
deems that "at the end of 10 days, a subject firm has received and consid-
ered all information which would have been available to it had a reason-
able, expeditious, and diligent investigation been undertaken."' 129
Where a subject firm has not notified the Commission in a timely fash-
ion within the meaning of section 15 and the regulations, the Commission
may seek assessment of civil penalties under section 20. The Commission
122. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(e) (1980).
123. Id.
124. Id §§ 1115.12(a), 1115.14(d).
125. Id § 1115.14(e).
126. Id. Weekends and holidays are excluded from these calculations. Id § 1115.14(a).
127. Id § 1115.13(c). The earlier rules required a covered firm to make an initial notifi-
cation to the Commission within 24 hours of receiving information which reasonably sup-
ported the conclusion that there was a substantial product hazard. d. § 1115.6. The initial
notification would identify the product in question, describe the course of distribution, and
"[sipecify the nature and extent of the defect or failure to comply." Id § 1115.5(a)-
1115.5(e).
128. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14(d) (1980).
129. Id
1981]
Catholic University Law Review
has brought several "timeliness" cases for failure to report promptly
enough.' 30 In one of the earlier timeliness cases, 13' certain Corning Elec-
tromatic Percolators manufactured in 1974 were alleged to have defective
epoxy presenting a potential hazard of thermal burns. The percolators at
issue suffered an adaptor top separation problem involving the risk that
the ceramic bowl would separate from the stainless steel handle assembly.
Corning had submitted a section 15(b) report to the Commission on
June 11, 1976. The Commission filed a Notice of Violation and Assess-
ment of Civil Penalty in which it sought a $400,000 penalty for Corning's
failure to immediately inform the Commission of the alleged hazard. In
bringing its timeliness action, the Commission relied on the Bureau of
Compliance staffs allegations that as early as April 3, 1973, Corning's
quality control staff knew of the problem and that on December 19, 1974,
the manager of product assurance had obtained authorization to stop man-
ufacturing and had suggested a recall. The Commission staff further
claimed that Corning testing confirmed the existence of adaptor top sepa-
ration; that in 1975 alone Corning received approximately 3,018 consumer
complaints reporting adaptor top separations; and that by January 5, 1975,
Corning had received approximately 202 reports of related consumer inju-
ries. 132 Corning settled the proposed timeliness penalty for $325,000. 33
The Commission settled another proposed civil penalty against Wham-
O Manufacturing Company 34 arising from allegedly faulty safety latches
on many of the Power Master Crossbow Models No. 718, manufactured
between August, 1974 and March, 1976. The Commission proposed a
$125,000 penalty for willful violation of the notice rules, claiming that
Wham-O quality control inspectors knew of the manufacturing defects
and reported this information to company superiors five months before
Wham-O notified the Commission. Specifically, in proceeding against
Wham-O, the Commission alleged that the company received numerous
complaints over a period of fifteen months before reporting the faulty
safety latches. The complaint asserted that at least five months prior to
130. Where the Commission issues a notice of violation of the § 15 timeliness require-
ments, the subject firm has the opportunity to show cause why a penalty should not be
assessed. Where the Commission determines that the responding firm has not shown suffi-
cient cause why a penalty should not be assessed, the matter is tried before an administrative
law judge.
13 1. Bureau of Compliance Application for Order to Show Cause and Notice of Viola-
tion, Coming Glass Works, Inc., CPSC Docket No. 77-4 (undated).
132. Id
133. Coming Glass Works, Inc., CPSC Docket No. 77-4 (July 14, 1977).




reporting the company "had returned the string latches for re-heat-treating
and testing," and, further, that internal memoranda to responsible com-
pany officers contained "statements that the defect made the crossbows
'dangerous products' and that the firm should cease production of cross-
bows with defective string latches."' 35 The Commission accepted a civil
penalty of $40,000 in settlement.
Pittway Corporation settled for $100,000 another late reporting claim
relating to incorrectly rated resistors used in smoke detectors manufac-
tured from March, 1974 through September 26, 1975.136 Having learned
of the potential fire hazard from other sources, the Commission contacted
Pittway on March 26, 1976. In bringing its civil penalty action for failure
to notify the Commission timely, the Commission charged that between
September, 1975 and January, 1976, Pittway obtained information which
reasonably supported the conclusion that certain of its smoke detectors
contained a defect which could create a substantial product hazard. The
Commission asserted that the smoke detectors contained a design error
since the carbon resistors in the smoke detectors were being used at or near
their rated capacity and were being overpowered, leading to overheating
and fires. Commission investigators alleged that Pittway learned of the
defect as early as September, 1975, when one of their engineers investi-
gated a fire in one of the detectors placed in a prison facility; that Pittway
subsequently received a letter from the U.S. Bureau of Prisons advising of
seven detector-related fires at facilities; and that Pittway's own records
showed that between September, 1975 and February, 1976, consumers re-
turned 126 units with evidence of burned resistors as well as two reported
fires.' 3
7
135. The complaint also alleged: "Observations and tests of returned crossbows were
made by receiving department employees, who noted a number of defective string latches
and cases of premature firing. Not only was the company aware of the returns, but this
employee confirmed the defect by testing the returned crossbows." Id.
136. Pittway Corp., CPSC Docket No. 78-4 (August 18, 1978).
137. Id The Commission also reached a $25,000 settlement with North American Sys-
tems, Inc., for an alleged untimely notification following the recall of 3.1 million Mr. Coffee
units. North American Systems, Inc. (Mr. Coffee), CPSC Docket No. 77-3 (June 16, 1977).
The Commission recently extended offers in settlement of alleged timeliness violations by
Braun of North America, a Gillete Co. subsidiary, and Century Products for $45,000 and
$25,000 respectively. The Braun settlement involved 9,300 "Aero Master" coffee makers
which the Commission claimed contained defective thermostats which could cause overheat-
ing. The firm filed a substantial product hazard report with the Commission in August of
1978 and thereupon undertook corrective action. But the Commission stated that Braun
received 14 complaints between December, 1976, and August, 1978.
Century Products was the manufacturer of approximately 300 "747 Command" high
chairs between March 1974 and February 1975. The Commission staff stated that the firm
received 5 complaints long before its August, 1977 "substantial product hazard" report to
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In a consent order agreement noteworthy both for the dollar amount of
the timeliness penalty and the scope of the remedy, 38 the Commission and
Bassett Furniture Co. settled a Commission complaint over hazards associ-
ated with Bassett's "Candlelight" and "Mandalay" style cribs, which the
CPSC reported had caused six infant deaths since 1977. By the terms of
the agreement, Bassett undertook an extensive remedial action program
and paid a $175,000 civil penalty. As part of the required remedial action,
Bassett agreed to run one-half page advertisements in TV Guide and Fam-
ily Circle magazines, periodicals having between them a total readership
of approximately 27,000,000 people, and to pay a $5 cash award to anyone
identifying a crib that had been unmodified pursuant to the repair provi-
sions of the agreement. Perhaps most significantly, Bassett was required to
send hazard notifications by direct mail to all parents having had children
within the previous twenty-one months. The CPSC estimated that this
mailing would reach more than four million parents of infants and small
children. 39
There does not, to date, appear to be a consistent attitude by the Com-
mission towards the amount of fines to be assessed in relation to the sever-
ity of the injury or the specifics of the failure to report. For example, the
Bassett fine of $175,000, involving six or seven reported infant deaths, was
significantly less than the 1976 fine imposed on Corning Glass Works of
$325,000 involving no deaths.' 4°
More recently, the Commission filed four separate actions under section
15 alleging failure to timely notify the Commission of "substantial product
hazards:" In re Marriott Corporation;'4 ' In re State Fair of Texas;'42 In re
Advance Machine Company;'43 and In re Athlone Industries, Inc. ' Both
the Marriott and State Fair suits involve amusement park rides: Marriott's
roller coaster ride known as the Willard's Whizzer, and the State Fair's
aerial tramway known as the Swiss Skyride. The complaint against Marri-
ott recounted injuries to thirty-three persons in two separate accidents in
the Commission. 9 Prod. Saf. Letter, 2 (Sept. 8, 1980); 1 PROD. SAF. AND LIAB. REP. (BNA)
639 (Sept. 5, 1980).
138. News from CPSC, 80-06, at 1-3 (Feb. 14, 1980).
139. Id.
140. See Bassett Furniture, Inc., CPSC Docket No. 80-002 at 1-2 (Feb. 7, 1980).
141. CPSC Docket No. 80-7 (Aug. 28, 1980), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 70,964 (Oct. 27,
1980).
142. CPSC Docket No. 80-8 (Aug. 28, 1980), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 70,962 (Oct. 27,
1980).
143. CPSC Docket No. 80-4 (Sept. 3, 1980), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 59,372 (Sept. 9,
1980).




the summer of 1976, eleven incidents between 1976 and 1979 involving
collisions due to brake failures or injuries to guests on the ride, and one
death in 1980 in an accident in which eight other persons were injured.
The complaint concluded that by July 24, 1976, and in any event no later
than September, 1979, Marriott knew of information that the ride's brakes
failed or were not sufficient to prevent collisions, that such information
was reportable within the meaning of section 15(b), and that Marriott
failed to report the information immediately.'
45
The complaint against the State Fair alleged that Fair officials knew of
an October 21, 1979 accident in which two gondolas on the Swiss Skyride
fell to the ground, resulting in one death and eighteen additional injuries.
The complaint attributed the accidents to the ride's lack of a device to
measure wind velocity and shut the machine down during high winds, as
well as the absence of cable catchers to retain the cable in the event the
cable snapped, and charged that the lack of these safeguards constituted
defects within the meaning of section 15(a)(2). The complaint further al-
leged that on October 21, 1979 State Fair officials refused to permit Com-
mission investigators access to the ride or to provide complete information
concerning the ride, its operation, and the injury reports. 146
The Advance Machine and Athlone suits involve the manufacturer and
exclusive distributor, respectively, of pitching machines used by baseball
players. The Commission alleged that the pitching machine spring and
cable, even when disconnected from its power source, retain a high degree
of tension which, when it vibrates, can cause the machines' metal pitching
arm to go through the pitching motion, injuring bystanders. The com-
plaint recounts a history of serious injuries caused by this machine dating
back to 1965, and charges that Athlone's failure to report the problem until
July, 1977, and Advance Machine's failure to report at any time, violated
the timely reporting obligations.' 47
These two actions are of special interest because in 1977 the Commis-
sion filed an "imminent hazard" action under section 12 of the Act con-
cerning the same pitching machines. Both Advance Machine and Athlone
entered a 1979 consent agreement terminating the section 12 action. The
Commission had not sought civil penalties in the section 12 suit, nor did
the consent agreement in the earlier action stipulate that the Commission
145. 45 Fed. Reg. 70,965 (1980). On January 27, 1981, the Commission announced that
Marriott had agreed to pay a civil penalty of $70,000 in settlement of the case. 10 Prod. Saf.
Letter 2 (Feb. 2, 1981).
146. 45 Fed. Reg. 70,963-64 (1980).
147. See notes 143-44 supra.
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was free to later prosecute section 15 timeliness issues. 118
G. When Is the Commission 'Adequately Informed?"
A firm is not required to file a section 15(b) report if it possesses "actual
knowledge that the Commission has been adequately informed of such
defect or failure to comply."' 4 9 The Commission is adequately informed
when it has received all pertinent product information which is "reason-
ably available."' 5 ° The regulations further define adequately informed as
a situation in which "the Commission staff has received the information
(provided in Intitial Reports and Final Reports). . .insofar as it is reason-
ably available and applicable or that the staff has informed the subject firm
that the staff is adequately informed."''
H. What Information Should be Reported
1. Initial Reports
The rules require an initial report to contain, if "reasonably available
and/or applicable," the identity and description of the product, the names
and addresses of the manufacturers or importers (or if unknown, the dis-
tributors or retailers), the nature of the defect or failure to comply with a
product safety rule, the nature of the injury or risk of injury, the name of
the person submitting the information, and, where available, any addi-
tional information required of a "full" report.52
148. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss,
Athlone Indus., Inc., CPSC Docket No. 80-5 (Aug. 28, 1980).
149. Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1976).
150. The comments preceding the 1978 rules explain:
Final § 1115.3(a) indicates that the Commission staff will be "adequately in-
formed" when supplied with information which is "reasonably available." In ad-
dition the revised definition permits the staff to inform a subject firm that the staff
is "adequately informed." Thus, sometimes a manufacturer or other subject firm
may have to submit a full report in order for the staff to make a hazard determina-
tion. At other times less than a full report will "adequately inform" the staff.
16 C.F.R § 1115.3(c) (1980).
151. Id. § I115.3(a).
152. Id. § 1115.13(c):
(I) An identification and description of the product.
(2) The name and address of the manufacturer (or importer) or, if the manufac-
turer or importer is not known, the names and addresses of all known distributors
and retailers of the product.
(3) The nature and extent of the possible defect or the failure to comply with an
applicable consumer product safety rule.
(4) The nature and extent of the injury or risk of injury associated with the product.
(5) The name and address of the person informing the Commission.
(6) To the extent such information is then reasonably available, the data specified
in § 1115.13(d) [the provision for "full" reports].
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Distributors and retailers may satisfy their reporting obligations by
making the "initial report."
2. Full Reports
Manufacturers and importers, after filing an initial report, must file a
"full report." The regulations set out the information required in a full
report," 3 which must include, where applicable: (1) the name, address,
and title of the person submitting the full report; (2) the name and address
of the manufacturer or the importer; (3) a description of the products (in-
cluding price, serial, model or date codes, and a picture or sample of the
product); (4) a description of the defect or noncompliance with an applica-
ble rule; (5) the nature of the injury or potential injury associated with the
defect or noncompliance; (6) a detailed description and chronology of the
manner in which the defect or noncompliance was determined; (7) the
number of products involved; (8) the dates of any sale, transfer or ship-
ment of the products; (9) the present location of the products; (10) a
description of and timetable for any corrective changes (e.g., designs, ad-
justments, testing) which have been or will be undertaken; (11) informa-
tion (such as letters, news releases, labels) about the defect or
noncompliance which has been or will be sent to consumers; (12) a plan
and schedule for any refund, replacement, or repair of the products; and
(13) a detailed description of the manufacture, marketing, and distribution
of the product. The rules further provide that a manufacturer or importer
may be required to submit the names and addresses of distributors, retail-
ers, and purchasers (including consumers) as well as any additional infor-
mation requested by the Commission staff.' The Commission rules
require a subject firm's chief executive officer (or delegate pursuant to a
written delegation) to file any written reports to the Commission under
section 15(b).' 55 Covered firms may find that they are subject to reporting
153. The former rules, at 16 C.F.R. § 1115.7 (1975), set out detailed requirements for
"subsequent notification" to the Commission, including a fuller description of the identity,
and location of the products, the nature of the product hazard, and any corrective steps the
firm had undertaken or planned to undertake, including notice to the public and purchasers,
including consumers, and any refund, replacement, or repair actions.
154. 16 C.F.R § 1115.13(d) (1980).
155. The 1978 rules provided recommended language for an acceptable "Delegation of
Authority" at 16 C.F.R. § 1115.13. The chief executive officer must sign any § 15(b) report
unless a written delegation has been submitted to the Product Defect Correction Divison or
is submitted simultaneously with the § 15(b) report. 43 Fed. Reg. 34,994 (1978) (now codi-
fied in 16 C.F.R. § 1115.13(a) (1980)).
In its comments accompanying 16 C.F.R. § 1115.13 (1978), the Commission states:
[T]he delegation of authority is frequently made to the product safety officer of a
subject firm whose job usually includes a liaison function with government agen-
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requirements under more than one product safety statute. For example,
the manufacturer of a toxic substance which creates a substantial risk of
injury to the public could simultaneously be subject to reporting require-
ments of the Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Commission's rules
state that even where a product safety problem triggers reporting require-
ments under a different statute or regulation, the firm must also file a sec-
tion 15(b) report where applicable under the Act and the Commission's
regulations.' 56
V. PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO REPORTS
A. Commission Procedures Generally
When the Commission determines that a covered firm has failed to re-
port a defect or a noncompliance which represents a substantial product
hazard, it issues a Notice of Enforcement naming the firm as respon-
dent. '5 The rules provide that the Commission may, following an admin-
istrative hearing, enter an order under section 15(c) requiring notice of a
substantial product hazard to the public, manufacturers, distributors, re-
tailers, and purchasers. Under section 15(d), the Commission may order
cies in the area of product safety. This individual is the logical choice as designee
because this person has information sources valuable to both the Commission and
the subject firm in addressing any potential hazard. In the Commission's nearly
four years of experience working with the delegation system, the system has been a
valuable tool in establishing contact with the employees of subject firms who can
move quickly to identify and correct hazards.
43 Fed. Reg. 34,994 (1978).
156. The prefatory comments to the final rules acknowledge the potential of overlapping
reporting requirements with this discussion:
Whenever the Commission receives a report about a product that is also subject to
a reporting requirement of another agency, it attempts to communicate with the
other agency to establish how to address the situation and the potential safety haz-
ard presented. The other agencies do the same. The Commission believes this
procedure is adequate and provides sufficent guidance to the subject firms in-
volved, once they have reported. However, if it appears necessary, the Commis-
sion will attempt to establish interagency procedures regarding reporting
obligations where jurisdiction is overlapping or unclear, will notify the public if
interagency procedures are established, and will amend this regulation accord-
ingly. Meanwhile, the Section 15(b) reporting requirements apply to consumer
products, even if the reporting requirements of another agency also apply.
43 Fed. Reg. 34,990 (1978).
157. Corporate officers can be named as respondents in a Notice of Enforcement if they
are in "top control" of the corporation, "formulating, directing and controlling corporate
policies and practices" of the corporation, or having responsibility and authority either to
prevent in the first instance or promptly correct an alleged substantial product hazard. Kel-
vinator, CPSC Docket 75-1 at 28.
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the repair, replacement, or refund of the purchase price for any product
presenting a substantial product hazard. 158 The same procedure governs
regardless of whether the product noncompliance or substantial product
hazard information is voluntarily reported by a firm, developed by investi-
gation of the Commission staff, or gathered by both methods.
The Product Defect Correction Division of the Directorate of Compli-
ance and Enforcement (CEPD) has established procedures for evaluating
product safety information, rendering a preliminary determination as to
whether the product presents a substantial product hazard, and taking ap-
propriate corrective action.' 59 The Hazard Evaluation Branch (HEB) of
CEPD investigates and evaluates reports of potential product safety
hazards received from subject firms or from other sources. The Hazard
158. Hearings are conducted in accordance with CPSA § 15(0, Administrative Proce-
dure Act § 554, 5 U.S.C. § 554, and the Commission's Rules of Practice for Adjudicative
Proceedings, 16 C.F.R. § 1025 (1980).
159. The Directorate of Compliance and Enforcement recently reorganized its § 15 en-
forcement staffing, combining Enforcement Division and CEPD staff to form a new Division
of Administrative Litigation under the renamed Directorate of Compliance and Administra-
tive Litigation. Part of the CEPD staff is assigned to a new Division of Corrective Actions,
also within the Directorate of Compliance and Administrative Litigation. On December 14,
1978, the Commission delegated authority to its staff to handle minor statutory infractions
and certain adjudicatory matters, including § 15 violations. Under the delegation, Area Di-
rectors of field offices advise the Director of Compliance and Enforcement (now Compliance
and Administrative Litigation) (C&E) whether there has been a violation of the Act and
recommend opening an enforcement case. See 16 C.F.R. § 1000.27 as amended 45 Fed.
Reg. 86415 (Dec. 31, 1980). The Directorate of Compliance and Administrative Litigation
can recommend to the Commission compliance action or closing the case. "Case Authority
Delegations," Commission Decision (December 14, 1978). These procedures are set out in
the CEPD Memorandum of February 1, 1979. See notes 78-82 and accompanying text
suprPa.
The 1975 regulations provided for "case openings" upon receipt of a § 15(b) notification
from a covered firm or "information concerning a product defect from [other] sources." 16
C.F.R. § II 16.4(a)(I)-1 I 16.4(a)(2) (1975). Where the staff made a "tentative evaluation"
that there existed a substantial product hazard, the staff could require the covered firm to
submit the detailed report provided for in 16 C.F.R. § 1115.7 (1974). In addition, the 1975
regulations required of the staff to make a "preliminary determination" concerning the po-
tential product hazard, 16 C.F.R. § 1116.5 (1975), and stated: "In order to afford the greatest
possible protection to the public, the staff shall resolve any reasonable doubts in its tentative
evaluation and preliminary determination in favor of finding that the product could present
a substantial product hazard." 16 C.F.R. § 11 16.5(b) (1975). The old rules set a timetable of
30 calendar days from the case opening for staff presentation to the Commission of (a) a
proposed Corrective Action Plan, (b) a proposed Consent Agreement and Commission Or-
der, (c) a proposed Notice of Enforcement and Recommendation for hearings pursuant to
§ 15(0, or (d) a recommendation that the case be closed. 16 C.F.R. § 1116.7 (1975). The
regulations also provided for automatic staff investigations of "the possibility of any unlaw-
ful act committed by a manufacturer, distributor or retailer that relates to a failure to ade-
quately inform the Commission that a consumer product could create a substantial product
hazard."
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Correction Branch (HCB) of CEPD has authority to secure and, where
appropriate, monitor corrective actions, including corrective action plans.
The directors of HEB and HCB and other Commission staff sit on a
Hazard Assessment Committee. The Hazard Assessment Committee is
authorized to recommend to the director of CEPD that a product safety
matter represents a substantial product hazard requiring corrective action;
that a proffered corrective action by a subject firm should "be monitored at
a reduced level"; or that a preliminary determination has been made that
the matter should not be pursued by CEPD. The Hazard Assessment
Committee will recommend that corrective action be sought when a sub-
stantial risk of injury is discerned and the consumer product in question
"appears to have a causal relationship to the risk."' 6° Where the Commis-
sion has received information from a subject firm but has determined that
the risk of injury is less than substantial, and the firm has volunteered to
undertake corrective action, the Hazard Assessment Committee will rec-
ommend that a corrective action plan be monitored "at a reduced
level."' 6
When the staff determines that a substantial risk of injury to the public
cannot be identified, and where no corrective action is pursued by the sub-
ject firm, the Hazard Assessment Committee will recommend that the mat-
ter not be pursued by CEPD. If information suggests the presence of a risk
of injury but other factors indicate that CEPD action is not appropriate,
the Hazard Assessment Committee will recommend to the Director of the
Product Defect Corrective Division that the information be forwarded to
the Emerging Priorities/Special Projects Team or another appropriate
group. 162
In its investigation, the Commission staff will refer to "any source in-
cluding, but not limited to, subject firms, experts within and without the
Commission, and consumers." The staff will request additional data from
subject firms, conduct inspections, and use any other appropriate investi-
gative measures.' 63 Where CEPD determines that a product does not
comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule, it refers the mat-
ter to the appropriate area office to secure voluntary corrective action."6
Should CEPD determine that a product creates a risk of injury which is
not within the scope of an applicable consumer product safety rule, it will
make a preliminary determination as to whether the product contains a
160. CEPD Memorandum, attachment I at 1, 2.
161. Id at 2.
162. Id. at 2-3.
163. Id
164. Id at 3.
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defect. If the CEPD staff decides that a product does contain such a de-
fect, it will undertake further evaluation to determine if the defect creates a
substantial risk of injury to the public within the meaning of section
15(a)(2) and the regulations. 165
If CEPD makes a preliminary determination that a consumer product
represents a substantial risk of injury to the public, corrective action will
usually be sought by the Compliance and Enforcement staff. While correc-
tive action may be sought through issuance of either an administrative or
judicial complaint, CEPD ordinarily tries to secure voluntary corrective
actions. Corrective action sought by the staff will usually include notice to
the public regarding the product hazard and elimination of the hazard
through a repair, replacement, or refund program.
The CEPD memorandum states that acceptable corrective public notice
will typically include some or all of the following methods of disseminat-
ing hazard and recall notices: notice may be "communicated directly to
distributors, retailers, and consumers by mail or telephone or telegraph
... . supplied with replacement parts for the involved product ....
posted in retail stores and in repair shops. . . , communicated to the pub-
lic through paid advertising in the media by which the product itself is
advertised . . . .[or] communicated to the public through public service
announcements or the coverage by the news media." 166 An additional way
of securing this notice is through a joint Commission/company press re-
lease. 167
In its effort to secure voluntary compliance, Compliance and Enforce-
165. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1980). The CEPD Memorandum provides guidelines for deter-
mining when corrective action should not be pursued within CEPD:
*The product does not contain a defect within the meaning of Section 15 of the
CPSA.
*The product contains a defect but does not present a substantial risk of injury
within the meaning of Section 15 of the CPSA.
*The product is regulated as to the identified hazard. The matter is, therefore,
referred to regulatory management within Compliance Enforcement.
*The product may have presented a substantial risk of injury at one time, but no
longer does.
*The Commission has proposed or is considering proposing a regulation dealing
with the product and hazard. The matter could, therefore, be referred to Regula-
tory Management and to Program Management.
*The matter seems to indicate an industry-wide defect which will consume consid-
erable resources to correct either by CEPD Section 15 action or through proceed-
ing in CEPD section 15 action or through promulgation of a standard or ban.
Before proceeding in CEPD the advice of the Emerging Priorities/Special Projects
Team of Program Management or of the Commission itself is sought.
Id at 9-10.
166. Id. at 11.
167. Id.
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ment will encourage firms to voluntarily repair or replace products or offer
refunds of the purchase price.'68 Where a firm elects to repair or replace
the product, Compliance and Enforcement will evaluate and monitor the
corrective action "to ensure that the substantial product hazard has been
eliminated."69
B. Options for Commission Action
Section 15(c)' 70 provides that the Commission, following a hearing, may
require covered firms to notify the public, manufacturers, distributors, re-
tailers, and purchasers of the existence of a substantial product hazard.
Any firm or individual in the distribution chain may be subject to an order
under section 15(C).' 17 However, a firm with a product which does not
168. Id. at 11-12.
169. Id at 12.
170. Section 15(c) states:
If the Commission determines (after affording interested persons, including con-
sumers and consumer organizations, an opportunity for a hearing in accordance
with subsection (f) of this section) that a product distributed in commerce presents
a substantial product hazard and that notification is required in order to ade-
quately protect the public from such substantial product hazard, the Commission
may order the manufacturer or any distributor or retailer of the product to take
any one or more of the following actions:
(1) To give public notice of the defect or failure to comply.
(2) To mail notice to each person who is a manufacturer, distributor, or retailer
of such product.
(3) To mail notice to every person to whom the person required to give notice
knows such product was delivered or sold.
Any such order shall specify the form and content of any notice required to be
given under such order.
The Senate bill, S. 3419, provided in § 313(b)(1) that following an agency adjudication of
noncompliance with an "applicable order issued pursuant to this title," a covered firm could
be required by the agency (by order after an adjudicatory hearing) to give public notice
containing the pertinent product safety information, and to mail this notice to consumers
and others in the distribution chain. S. 3149, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 313(b)(i) (1972).
The House Committee Report on H.R. 15003 states:
In order to compel notification under this section, the Commission must afford
interested persons an opportunity to orally present their views in addition to af-
fording them the opportunity to make written presentations. Like the administra-
tive procedures contained in § 9, this marks a departure from traditional informal
rulemaking authority.
H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1972).
171. The sweep of the Commission's Section 15(c) authority is evidenced by this com-
ment in the Senate Commerce Committee Report on the Senate bill, S.3419:
In addition to the authority to require public notice, including notice through the
electronic media when necessary to protect the public health and safety, the Ad-
ministrator could by order require anyone in the distribution chain to mail to each
consumer of such product a notification of a failure to comply or a manufacturing
defect containing such information as the Administrator may prescribe, upon the
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comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule (and which is
therefore required to file section 15(b) reports with the Commission) will
not be subject to the notice requirements of section 15(c) unless the non-
compliance with the rule actuallypresents a substantial product hazard. 1
72
With respect to notifying purchasers, section 15(c)(3) should not be in-
terpreted to require individual notice to purchasers unknown to the
covered firm at the time of the Commission order.' 73 The legislative his-
tory indicates that section 15(c) authorizes the Commission to order a sub-
ject firm to purchase advertising space or broadcast time to disseminate
product hazard information. 74 Congress did not, however, impose any
concomitant obligation on the print or broadcast media to sell or donate
advertising space or broadcast time for product hazard notices pursuant to
section 15(c).' 75
Where a particular product safety question has generated great public
interest and attention, the Commission may choose not to require firms to
publish additional public notice. An example of this is the section 15 pro-
ceeding concerning hand-held hair dryers containing asbestos.' 76 In ac-
Administrator's determination that such notification is required to protect ade-
quately the public health or safety. In any such notice, the manufacturer should
not be permitted to disclaim the existence of the defect or the failure to comply.
S. REP. No. 749, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1972).
172. Consumer Produce Safety Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1976).
173. The House Commerce Committee Report on H.R. 15003, supra note 170, at 42
states:
It should be noted that manufacturers, distributors, and retailers may only be re-
quired to mail notice to customers who are known to them. This is intended to
mean customers of whom they have actual knowledge. Thus, the Commission
would not have authority to require a manufacturer to comb the files of its retailers
to learn the names of customers who have purchased the product.
174. The House Commerce Committee Report on H.R. 15003, supra note 170, at 41, 42
(1972), states that "[ilt is contemplated that a Commission order requiring public notice
may, in appropriate cases, include a requirement that the manufacturer, distributor, or re-
tailer purchase broadcasting time or buy advertising space in magazines or newspapers."
The notice provision of S. 3419 provided, at § 313(b)(1), for "public notice (including
notice through electronic media when necessary to protect public health and safety)." S.
3149, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
175. The House Commerce Committee Report on H.R. 15003 explains:
While broadcasters and other media may wish to make time and space available
without charge, there is no compulsion that they do so. Nor is it intended that
broadcasters or news media be required to sell time or space in order to facilitate
public notice under this section. A manufacturer, retailer, or distributor who is
ordered to purchase broadcasting time, but is unable to do so, would be deemed to
have complied with the Commission's order so long as he exercised good faith in
attempting to carry out the Commission's directive.
supra note 170, at 41-42. See 118 CONG. REC. 31,387 (1972) (remarks of Reps. Pickle and
Staggers).
176. CPSC News Release 79-13 (Mar. 30, 1979).
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cepting the corrective action plans presented by one group of eleven firms,
the Commission adopted the CEPD staffs reasoning "that with regard to
notice, the public has been informed to a sufficient extent of the hazard
and that the remedies offered can be adequately announced by the meth-
ods proposed by the firms [largely notice throughout the respective distri-
bution chains] and by current Commission activities (e.g., the hotline and
Commission mailings)."'177
Section 15(c) notices will often include a description of the program the
firm has adopted to correct the safety problem. Although the practice has
been that most firms voluntarily implement remedial programs, section
15(d) of the Act does authorize the Commission, following a hearing, to
order a covered firm to recall, repair or replace a product which presents a
substantial product hazard, or to refund the purchase price less a reason-
able allowance for use. 178
As with section 15(c), section 15(d) orders may apply to more than one
177. M. Everhardt, Memorandum to the Commission at 2 (May 14, 1979).
178. Section 15(d) provides:
If the Commission determines (after affording interested parties, including con-
sumers and consumer organizations, an opportunity for a hearing in accordance
with subsection (f)) that a product distributed in commerce presents a substantial
product hazard and that action under this subsection is in the public interest, it
may order the manufacturer or any distributor or retailer of such product to take
whichever of the following actions the person to whom the order is directed elects:
(1) To bring such product into conformity with the requirements of the applica-
ble consumer product safety rule or to repair the defect in such product.
(2) To replace such product with a like or equivalent product which complies
with the applicable consumer product safety rule or which does not contain the
defect.
(3) To refund the purchase price of such product (less a reasonable allowance
for use, if such product has been in the possession of a consumer for one year or
more (A) at the time of public notice under subsection (c), or (B) at the time the
consumer receives actual notice of the defect or noncompliance whichever first oc-
curs).
An order under this subsection may also require the person to whom it applies to
submit a plan, satisfactory to the Commission, for taking action under whichever
of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection under which such person has elected
to act. The Commission shall specify in the order the persons to whom refunds
must be made if the person to whom the order is directed elects to take the action
described in paragraph (3). If an order under this subsection is directed to more
than one person, the Commission shall specify which person has the election under
this subsection. An order under this subsection may prohibit the person to whom it
applies from manufacturing for sale, offering for sale, distributing in commerce, or
importing into the customs territory of the United States (as defined in general
head-note 2 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States), or from doing any com-
bination of such actions, the product with respect to which the order was issued.
Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(c), (d).
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respondent and may impose differing remedial duties.' 79 For example,
where a refund was ordered for certain aluminized kites,' 8° the adminis-
trative law judge described the refund obligations of the manufacturer,
distributors, and retailers inter se:
Clearly where the claim is made directly to the manufacturer,
the latter is responsible for refund of the retail price under the
conditions above set forth. The manufacturer would, of course,
be at liberty to pursue his legal remedies for reimbursement of
the respective mark-up from the distributor and retailer who hav-
ing sold the patently hazardous device should share the financial
responsibility therefor.
Where the claim is made to the retailer or distributor which
actually sold the kite in question, such seller must pay the full
allowable refund plus shipping charges if any were incurred. In
this situation the retailer or distributor may obtain reimburse-
ment from the manufacturer of the price he originally paid for
the kites, absorbing the loss of the retail or wholesale mark-up
plus shipping charges if any incurred.' 8 '
179. The House Commerce Committee Report on H.R. 15003 states:
The Commission is also authorized to specify which persons are to receive refunds
where that remedy is elected. This would permit the Commission to control not
only who will be entitled to refund but also what proof of claim must be made in
order for a person to recover the purchase price. Accordingly, the Commission is
intended to have authority to specify whether present owners or only first purchas-
ers are entitled to refund and whether the product must be tendered or whether the
sales slip or some other proof of purchase or ownership must be made.
Consumers who avail themselves of the remedy provided by Commission order
shall not be charged and must be reimbursed for any reasonable and foreseeable
expenses incurred in availing himself of the remedy. The Commission is given au-
thority to require any manufacturer, distributor, or retailer to reimburse any other
person in the distribution chain for his expenses in carrying out the Commission's
order. While it is expected that the Commission in the exercise of this authority
will most commonly order those at fault to reimburse others for their expenses, it is
contemplated that the Commission would have the authority to place this obliga-
tion on the person most able to bear the cost where equitable and other considera-
tions appear to warrant such action in the public interest. In this area, general
rules are neither appropriate nor feasible. The Commission would be expected to
exercise this power on an ad hoc basis taking into account the individual circum-
stances of each case.
H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1972).
180. Francis Alonso, Jr. (Mylar Star Kites), I CONS. PROD. SAF. GUIDE (CCH) 75,109
(initial decision) (1976)
18 1. Id. at 60,079. Referring to the language of the House Commerce Committee Re-
port, the Commission in Relco stated:
Neither of the two situations mentioned in the legislative history warranting elimi-
nation of a tender requirement appear to be applicable here. The record demon-
strates that the welder or the designated components are in a tenderable form and
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Section 15(d)(3) does not impose any mandatory tender requirement;
i e., the consumer is not invariably required to return a recalled product in
order to receive reimbursement. While the House Commerce Committee
contemplated such a requirement, it chose to leave the matter to the Com-
mission's discretion.'82 The Commission has thus imposed a tender re-
quirement whenever the product is in tenderable condition and there is no
showing that "tender of the product might unduly expose consumers and
persons within the distribution chain to the hazards associated with the
product." 8 3
Although section 15(d)(3) states that the firm subject to a section 15(d)
order has the election of repair, replacement, or refund, repair is not a
viable remedy for many products. 18 4 This is particularly so where the
product is inexpensive, or has a short useful life, or both. This was the case
in Mylar Star Kites, where the Administrative Law Judge's section 15(b)
order excluded repair as an available remedy. In that case, the parties hav-
ing conceded the "[r]epair of such kites. . . to be impractical," the manu-
facturer of aluminized kites was ordered to stop the manufacture of the
kites, to give public notice of the hazard, and to "replace all aluminized
kites produced and sold . . . with non-conductive kites, or refund their
purchase price." 85
A firm subject to a section 15(d) order may elect to refund the purchase
no danger is presented to persons in the recall channels. Given the strong Congres-
sional intent and the obvious statutory purpose of section 15, to protect the public
by encouraging removal of dangerous products from the marketplace and consum-
ers' homes, the Commission believes that tender should be required whenever
practicable where no danger is presented in the tender process. A prime example of
the danger to the public of a product which is not removed from the home was
presented in this case. A defective welder which had been stored by the owner
after not working properly was retrieved and caused a serious injury to a family
member. As the example in this case demonstrates, a refund allowance not accom-
panied by a tender requirement would not advance the purposes of the legislation
and might expose unwary consumers and other users to the dangers posed by the
hazardous product.
Relco, Inc., I CON. PROD. SAF. GUIDE (CCH) 75,121 at 60,143 (1976).
182. See notes 179, 181 supra.
183. Id.; Relco, Inc., I CONS. PROD. SAF. GUIDE (CCH) 75,121 (1976) (imposing
tender requirement on persons wishing to participate in a refund remedy ordered following
a finding that an electric arc welder presented a substantial product hazard).
184. It does not appear that the Commission could order resort to any one of the three
Section 15(d) remedies to the exclusion of the others, insofar as Section 15(d) only permits
the Commission to order the firm to "take whichever of the [three remedial options] the
person to whom the order is directed elects." Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(d)(3), 15
U.S.C. § 2064(d) (1976).
185. Francis Alonso, Jr. (Mylar Star Kites), I CoNs. PROD. SAF. GUIDE (CCH) $ 75,109
at 60,078 (1976) (initial decision).
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price "less a reasonable allowance for use, if such product has been in the
possession of a consumer for one year or more (A) at the time of public
notice under subsection (c), or (B) at the time the consumer receives actual
notice of the defect or noncompliance, whichever first occurs." ' 86 Section
15 requires a full refund to persons who have held the product for less than
one year.' 87
The Commission may specify the persons entitled to refunds, and may
impose proof of purchase requirements.18 8 For example, the order of the
Administrative Law Judge in Relco, Inc.,189 upon a finding that certain
electric arc welders presented a substantial product hazard, provided that
persons holding the welders for less than one year but no longer in posses-
sion could file claims for a 100% refund, without the need to show why
they no longer had the welder. Persons holding the welder for longer than
one year would be entitled to a fifty percent refund only upon filing an
affidavit indicating that they disposed of the welder after learning of its
unsafe characteristics. The Commission amended the order to place identi-
cal requirements of proof for all purchases no longer in the claimant's pos-
session. '90
Individuals other than manufacturers, distributors, or retailers entitled
to remedies under section 15(d) orders may not be charged for participat-
ing in the remedy, and the firm subject to a section 15(d) order must reim-
burse the person entitled to the remedy "for any reasonable and
foreseeable expenses incurred by such person in availing himself of such
remedy."' 9 ' Although no such orders have to date been issued, the Act
provides that under section 15(c) or (d) the Commission may require a
firm to reimburse other manufacturers, distributors, or retailers for "ex-
penses in connection with the order."' 92
Ordinarily a covered firm which submits a section 15(b) report, or which
receives Commission notification of a product noncompliance or defect
creating a substantial risk or injury to the public, will agree to a voluntary
corrective action or a consent order agreement plan. Commission rules
expressly provide for corrective action plans and section 15 consent orders
as the principal voluntary remedies available to subject firms.' The
186. Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(d)(3) (1976).
187. See Relco, Inc., I CONS. PROD. SAF. GUIDE (CCH) 75,121 at 60,143 n.4 (1976).
188. Id at 60,143 n.5.
189. See note 183 supra.
190. Relco, Inc., I CONS. PROD. SAF. GUIDE (CCH) 75,121 at 60,143.
191. Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(e)(1) (1976).
192. Consumer Product Safety Act § 15(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2064(e)(2) (1976).
193. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.20 (1980). The Cook-Kitzes Memorandum to the Commission
characterized the proposed rule revisions in this way: "These proposed rules retain the most
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Commission rules provide that a corrective action plan or a consent order
agreement may include a mechanism for recall, repair, replacement, or re-
fund (less a reasonable allowance for use) of the product.
Where the Commission staff and the covered firm are unable to agree on
appropriate voluntary corrective action, the Commission may authorize
the bringing of an enforcement action to remove the product from the
market. 194
Corrective action plans 95 are not legally binding on either the covered
firm or the Commission. The rules permit the Commission to reopen and
attempt to broaden a corrective action plan in the light of new information
or if it determines the plan does not adequately protect the public.' 9 6 A
corrective action plan does not require that the covered firm admit that a
defect or noncompliance creates a substantial product hazard. The rules
permit the firm to include in any plan the statement: "the submission of
this corrective action plan does not constitute an admission (by the subject
firm) that either reportable information or a substantial product hazard
exists." '197
The most significant substantive provisions included in a corrective ac-
successful provision of the present rules-the incentive to report. This incentive is provided
by the fact that a voluntary corrective action plan is a possible remedy if a firm has fulfilled
its reporting obligations under Section 15(b) of CPSA." Cook-Kitzes Memorandum, supra
note 35, at I.
194. Eg., Ambroy Corp., CPSA Docket No. 77-5 (Oct. 26, 1977); In re G.L. Elec. Flash-
heat Co., CPSC Docket No. 78-2 (Mar. 24, 1978).
195. 16 C.F.R § I1 15.20(a)(xiii) (1968). The 1975 rules under § 15 also prescribed the
requirements for "Corrective Action Plans," 16 C.F.R. § 1116.2 (1975), defined as "a reme-
dial program" prepared by the firm and "envisioned by the Commission as an expeditious
means of protecting the public from a substantial product hazard." 16 C.F.R. § i 16.2(b)(2),
(b)(2)(i) (1975).
196. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.20(a) (1980).
197. A corrective action plan is effective only upon acceptance by the Commission. 16
C.F.R. § I 15.20(a)(l)(xiv) (1980). In deciding whether to recommend that the Commission
approve the plan, the staff is directed to consider favorably the subject firm's promptness in
reporting and any remedial actions already undertaken. 1d § 11 15.20(a)(2) (1980). The
subject firm's previous involvement, if any, in a corrective action plan will also be consid-
ered "if such involvement bears on the likelihood that the firm will comply fully with the
terms of the corrective action plan." Id
Interested parties may file written comments on the plan by filing a Notice of Intent to
Comment at least 48 hours before the Commission meeting which will consider the plan.
Where such a Notice is filed, the Commission will, "if practicable," docket consideration of
the plan for the following week's agenda. Interested parties then must file any written com-
ments at least 48 hours before the session.
The 1975 rules provided for public participation in § 15 activities, including public availa-
bility of summaries of meetings and telephone conversations, and written comments on pro-




tion plan "as appropriate" are as follows: a description of the alleged haz-
ard, the nature of the alleged defect or noncompliance, and the injury or
potential injury presented; a proposal for the means of notice to the public,
including consumers, together with an identification of the classes of per-
sons who will be contacted, and copies of the notices to be used; a descrip-
tion of the corrective action which has been or will be undertaken,
including any provisions for repair, replacement, or refund; where the plan
calls for returning the products to the subject firm, a description of the
disposition of the product, e.g., reworked, destroyed, returned to foreign
manufacturer; a statement of steps that have been or will be taken to pre-
vent recurrence of the alleged hazards and to correct products already in
the distribution chain, including the number and location of these units
and a timetable for the corrective action.'98 The rules further require the
subject firm to acknowledge in the plan that the Commission may monitor
implementation of the plan and may require the subject firm to furnish
customer lists. The Commission may further require an agreement that
the Commission may publicize the terms of the plan.'9 9
A corrective action plan is effective only upon acceptance by the Com-
mission. 2" In deciding whether to recommend that the Commission ap-
prove the plan, the staff is directed to consider favorably the subject firm's
promptness in reporting and any remedial action already undertaken. 2°'
The subject firm's previous involvement, if any, in a corrective action plan
will also be considered "if such involvement bears on the likelihood that
the firm will comply fully with the terms of the corrective action plan. 20 2
Corrective action resolution of an alleged hazard has been followed
even where no injuries have been reported from use of the product.20 3
Upon receiving a corrective action plan, the Commission publishes a sum-
mary of its provisions in the Commission's Public Calendar and schedules
it for consideration by the full Commission.
Consent order agreements under section 15 of the Act may be proposed
by the Commission staff or the subject firm.2" An approved consent order
198. 16 C.F.R § 1I 15.20(a)(1) (1980).
199. Id.
200. Id § II 15.20(a)(l)(xiv).
201. Id. § 1I15.20(a)(2).
202. Id.
203. For example, Sears, Roebuck & Company and Red Devil, Inc. recalled thousands
of Sears 44791 and Red Devil 3401 electric paint removers due to a potential shock hazard
from a defect in wiring. Commission Announcement, [transfer Binder 1977-1979] CON.
PROD. SAF. GUIDE (CCH) 44,134 (May 22, 1978).
204. Consent orders include "a proposed complaint setting forth the staff's charges and a
proposed order by which such charges are resolved." The most significant additional re-
quirements for a consent order are that it include, "as appropriate," (1) an admission of
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operates as a final order in disposition of the proceeding.2"5 The rules per-
mit a subject firm to disclaim, in the consent order, the existence of report-
able information or the presence of a substantial product hazard, and
provide that any consent order may include a statement such as "the sign-
ing of this consent order agreement does not constitute an admission by
(the Consenting Party) that either reportable information or a substantial
product hazard exists. '"206
When the Commission receives a proposed consent order executed by
the subject firm and a Commission staff representative, the Commission
may either provisionally accept it or reject it.2°7 If the Commission provi-
sionally accepts the order, it places the agreement on the public record and
announces its provisional acceptance in its public calendar and the Federal
Register. Any person opposing the consent order has fifteen calendar days
from publication in the Federal Register to file a written request that the
Commission not accept the consent order.2° s
Where no such request is filed, the consent order becomes "finally ac-
cepted" twenty days after the announcement in the Federal Register.
Where a timely request is received, the Commission sets the matter down
for consideration and vote. 20 9 A consent order becomes effective only
upon acceptance by the Commission and service on the subject firm. The
Commission is free to publicly disclose the terms of the consent order.
The Commission has actively resorted to consent order resolution of sec-
tion 15 proceedings. It has approved hundreds of orders requiring notice
to the public and consumers, replacement or repair (including addition of
safety attachments), and the refund of the purchase price less allowances.
In 1976 alone, the Commission approved consent orders in 140 section 15
matters.210
jurisdictional facts by the subject firm and waiver of rights to any administrative or judicial
hearing or review of the consent order; (2) "[a] statement that the agreement is in settlement
of the stafis charges," (3) a statement that the Commission reserves the right to "seek sanc-
tions for any violations of the reporting obligations of section 15(b)" as well as any other
"appropriate legal action," (4) a statement that violation of the consent order is a prohibited
act under § 19(a)(5) of the Act and may subject the consenting party to civil and/or criminal
penalties under §§ 20 and 21 of the Act; (5) "[a] description of the alleged substantial prod-
uct hazard," (6) a statement that the consenting party will perform certain acts and will
refrain from certain acts pursuant to the agreement; and (7) a description of a corrective
action plan as provided for in 16 C.F.R. § 1115.20(a). 16 C.F.R. § 11 15.20(b)(1) (1980).
205. Id. § 1115.20(b)(5).
206. Id § 11 15.20(b)(l)(xii).
207. Id § 11 15.20(b)(3). The rules provide that the Commission may also take "any
other action as it may deem appropriate." Id.
208. Id. § II 15.20(b)(4).
209. Id. § 11 15.20(b)(5).
210. See, e.g., The Kite Cases, CPSC Docket Nos. 75-15, 17, 18, 19 (April 1, 1976); The
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If the Commission does not accept the consent order, it notifies the sub-
ject firm. This notification operates to withdraw the Commission's provi-
sional acceptance of the consent order. The Commission will then issue a
complaint, order" additional investigation, or take any other "appropriate"
211action.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the foregoing that the Commission proposes to use en-
hanced section 15 enforcement activity as both a sword and a shield. Its
use as a sword against manufacturers, distributors, retailers, or importers
who, in the Commission's view, have failed to enter timely reports of po-
tential product safety problems, will also serve as a shield against Commis-
sion critics who complain that the Commission has not satisfactorily
discharged its statutory obligation to expeditiously remove unsafe products
from the hands of consumers.
In so proceeding, there is the danger that the Commission's section 15
enforcement policies will prove the old axiom that every administrative
reform is accompanied by a new invitation for abuse. A potential for such
abuse can be found in the prosecution of timeliness cases against firms
with whom the Commission has previously litigated and settled product
safety questions under other sections of the Act.212 Another potential for
abuse is the anticipated use of section 15 enforcement to apply generic
standards to broad categories of products heretofore pursued by the Com-
mission in voluntary or mandatory standard setting proceedings. 2 , 3 An
additional abuse, no less serious because it is not at this time determinable,
is that the Commission will stretch the statutory definition of a "substantial
Aluminum Baseball Bats Cases, CPSC Docket Nos. 75-9, 10, !1, 12, 13, & 14 (Feb. 13,
1976). See also In re McCollock Corp., CPSC Docket No. 74-1 (May 6, 1974); In re Spray
Tech Corp., CPSC Docket No. 75-7 (Oct. 14, 1975); In re Terranan Indus., Inc., CPSC
Docket No. 76-C0028 (June 28, 1976); In re National Indus., Inc., CPSC Docket No. 74-2
(May 19, 1974).
211. Relco, Inc., CPSC Docket No. 74-4 (Jan. 17, 1975) (Order Rejecting Proposed Set-
tlement Agreement directs recovening of matter before administrative law judge).
212. See notes 143-48 and accompanying text supra.
213. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra. Section 15 regulation is best suited to
relatively limited instances of defective products. As one Commissioner has stated:
Unlike hazards which are inherent in a specific design and thus capable of being
corrected by a safety regulation, [substantial product hazards under Section 15]
hazards normally arise unexpectedly and in relatively isolated situations. Fre-
quently, they are related to quality control problems or assembly line malfunc-
tions. Typically, instead of appearing in all products in a certain way, the hazard
may arise only in a single manufacturer's product, or in a relatively small portion
of a production run.'
Statler Address, supra note 2, at 15.
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product hazard" into unrecognizable form in order to accommodate these
ends.214
Should the Commission continue on this course, covered firms will be
left uncertain as to what product safety criteria govern the merchandising
of consumer products, and consumers must rely solely on media an-
nouncements to determine what products are subject to Commission re-
call. In this connection, it cannot be overemphasized that rulemakings,
applicable to a broad class of firms or products, are generally preferable to
individual enforcement actions.215
A far better course would be for the Commission to try to remove the
procedural impediments to effective and prompt enforcement of its ban-
ning authority under section 8 of the Act, its standard setting authority
under section 7, and its imminent hazard, declaratory relief authority
under section 12.
214. This increased use of § 15 timeliness actions is also potentially at variance with the
Commission's § 15 regulations which imply that timeliness penalty actions will be used spar-
ingly. The Commission has stated:
[The Commission] does not believe that it should interpret the law primarily
through civil penalty actions brought to assess penalties for failure to comply with
the reporting requirements of § 15(b) of the CPSA. Most subject firms want to
comply with the law and will do so if their obligations are made clear: this regula-
tion offers guidance to these firms.
43 Fed. Reg. 34, 988 (1978).
215. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated in
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing FTC
v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 251 (1976)): "Rule-making avoids the problem of
singling out a single defendant among a group of competitors for initial imposition of a new
and inevitably costly legal obligation."
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